by: Kathleen P. Lundy[*]
Cite As: Kathleen P. Lundy, The Taxation of E-Commerce: The Inapplicability of Physical Presence Necessitates an Economic Presence Standard, 8 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12 (Fall 2001) at http://www.jolt.richmond.edu/v8i1/article2.html.
A. The Due Process Clause
1. Due Process and Personal Jurisdiction
2. Due Process and Taxation
B. The Commerce Clause
A. Existing Law
B. The Inapplicability of Physical Presence to Internet Vendors
1. No Longer the Bright-Line Test the Court Envisioned
2. Undue Burden Concerns Should Not Be a Determining Factor
C. Change is Necessary to Achieve Tax Neutrality
1. Courts Should Abandon Physical Presence Test in Favor of Economic Presence
i. Financial Institutions Analogy
ii. Geoffrey Decision
2. If Courts Do Not Address this Issue, Congress Should Act
{1}The explosive growth of electronic commerce has
served as a catalyst for immense economic growth.[1] Virtually every
aspect of traditional commerce now has some presence on the Internet. As such,
the way people shop for clothing, cars, airline tickets, and even groceries,
has been changed forever. However, these developments may also have drawbacks.
As more and more traditional brick-and-mortar stores transfer their operations
to the Internet, there are many unintended consequences. The traditional infrastructure
of retail stores may slowly begin to erode. Similarly, jobs in the retail industry
may be eliminated in favor of more efficient, more cost-effective Internet technology.
{2}Electronic commerce will also directly impact state and local governments
as their tax laws are not universally applicable to all Internet sales. Under
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, [2] an out-of-state
vendor must have a physical presence in a state before the state may require
it to collect sales taxes from its customers.[3] Examples of when physical presence has been found include
the presence of sales personnel, [4] the maintenance of local retail stores,
[5] and the solicitation of business by independent contractors
in the state.[6] Given the inherent nature of the Internet, this physical
presence requirement essentially enables Internet vendors to escape collection
requirements in most states where they have customers. At present, the only
acceptable means by which an Internet vendor can establish physical presence
is through the existence of a warehouse, office, or employees in a given state.
Operating a web site[7] or shipping goods[8]
into a state does not render an Internet vendor physically present in a state.
Courts disagree as to whether advertising is sufficient to create a physical
presence within a state.[9]
{3}Since states cannot require vendors without a physical presence to collect
sales tax,[10] as electronic commerce continues to grow, state and local
governments will lose an increasing percentage of their sales tax base each
year.[11] In 1999 alone, states lost $525
million in foregone sales taxes due to an inability to collect these taxes on
Internet purchases.[12] In other contexts where states cannot
collect sales taxes for the purchase of goods from out-of-state vendors, states
instead seek to collect a use tax.[13]
Use taxes are "imposed upon the storage, use, or consumption of tangible
personal property within the state, [with] property upon which sales tax has
been paid being exempt."[14] Such taxes "put
local retailers subject to the sales tax on a competitive parity with out-of-state
retailers exempt from the sales tax."[15]
{4}While the Constitution prohibits sales taxes from being assessed on purchases
made outside the state's borders,[16] use taxes may in fact be constitutionally
applied to such purchases, which are then brought into the taxing state for
use or consumption. These use taxes will become increasingly more important
as electronic commerce continues to grow and fewer Internet transactions are
subject to sales taxes as compared to traditional commerce.[17] Unlike sales
taxes, which are constitutionally restricted in their assessment upon
purchases,[18] the constitutional limitation upon
use taxes primarily arises in their collection. An out-of-state vendor
must have a taxable nexus with the state before it can be required to collect
the use tax from the consumer and remit it to the state.[19] As in the sales tax context, that nexus only exists if
the vendor has a physical presence in the state.[20] For example,
if a consumer purchases goods from either a mail-order or an Internet company,
neither of whom have a physical presence within the consumer's state of residence,
a state cannot assess a sales tax or require a vendor to collect a use tax on
the state's behalf for that purchase.
{5}Because the Constitution limits a state's ability to require vendors to collect
a use tax on the state's behalf, and not the state's authority to assess
the use tax on purchases used within the state, states will increasingly assess
use taxes in circumstances when a vendor lacks the physical presence sufficient
for the state to require the vendor to collect the sales or use tax. Unless
the vendor voluntarily collects the use tax, [21] however, it
must be collected directly from purchasers, thus posing severe collection problems
for state and local governments. Most states do not have an effective system
in place to monitor use tax obligations,[22] and thus, the majority of Americans are not aware of their
duties to pay such use taxes.[23] States would prefer requiring out-of-state
vendors to collect these use taxes from customers and then remit the revenues
to the states; since Internet vendors will rarely satisfy the physical presence
standard in more than a few states, the inherent nature of the Internet makes
an already difficult collection problem virtually impossible. It is estimated
that in 2000, state and local governments may have lost as much as $9.1 billion
in lost use tax revenues, one-third of which is attributable to use taxes
owed on Internet purchases.[24] By 2003, state and local governments will lose an estimated
$12.5 billion annually from lost sales taxes[25]
and an additional $20 billion annually in uncollected use taxes on Internet
purchases.[26]
{6}It quickly becomes apparent that the existing tax scheme is inherently unequal
in its tax treatment of traditional commerce versus e-commerce. Taxes on traditional
commerce are currently assessed and collected more effectively than on electronic
commerce, thus customers will be increasingly inclined to make their purchases
through the Internet because of the favorable tax treatment afforded to electronic
commerce. This result is inconsistent with the principle of tax neutrality,
that the taxes assessed on goods not impact a consumer's decision to purchase
goods from a particular vendor through a given medium.[27] The current system must be modified to create tax neutrality
across all forms of commerce, thus treating traditional brick-and-mortar, mail-order,
and Internet vendors equally. "Ideally, tax rules would not affect economic
choices about the structure of markets and commercial activity."[28]
{7}This paper argues that the physical presence standard cannot accommodate
the intricacies of electronic commerce. Under the current legal framework, it
will be impossible to achieve tax neutrality, because Internet vendors will
be able to avoid creating the physical presence that triggers
tax obligations in most states. Courts should abandon the physical presence
standard in favor of the economic presence standard adopted in
other contexts.[29] Such a standard is easily applicable to e-commerce transactions
and enables states to require vendors to collect sales and use tax revenues.
Alternatively, if the courts do not resolve this issue, Congress is empowered
under the Commerce Clause to legislatively overrule the physical presence requirement
and adopt a standard that restores tax neutrality to all forms of commerce.
{8}Part II discusses the Supreme Court cases addressing the constitutionality
of the states' application of sales and use tax requirements to out-of-state
vendors. The Supreme Court has essentially required that a vendor have a "substantial
nexus" to the taxing state, and has determined that only a physical presence
satisfies that requirement in the sales and use tax contexts. However, the emergence
of the Internet has created logistical problems in applying this physical presence
standard to electronic commerce, and these issues are discussed in Part III.
Finally, the efficacy of an economic presence is analyzed, and ultimately, economic
presence is suggested as an alternative to the ineffective physical presence
requirement.
{9}Two provisions of the Constitution
limit states' ability to require out-of-state vendors to collect
sales taxes: the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment[30]
and the Commerce Clause in Article I, section 8.[31]
The Constitutional tests for satisfying these provisions
were established well before the Internet became commonplace.
The two most pertinent cases regarding sales and use tax collection
by out-of-state vendors, National Bellas Hess v. Department
of Revenue[32] and Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota[33], both involved mail-order catalog companies
. The Commerce Clause, particularly the negative aspects of this
clause that limit state regulation, imposes the most significant
limitations on states' ability to require out-of-state vendors
to collect sales and use taxes. This Part addresses these Due
Process and Commerce Clause concerns respectively.
{10}The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution requires that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."[34] The Due Process Clause "centrally concerns the fundamental
fairness of governmental activity."[35] When the government
action at issue is a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over an individual,
the key question is whether the defendant had adequate notice that his "conduct
and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there."[36] Courts apply this due process analysis
used in ascertaining personal jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality
of a state's taxing scheme under the Due Process Clause.
1.
Due Process and Personal Jurisdiction
{11}To establish personal jurisdiction, a party must have
minimum contacts with a state "such that the maintenance of a suit does
not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"[37] Due process may be satisfied by an out-of-state vendor
who "purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in
the forum State."[38] The Court has recognized:
it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted. So long as a commercial actor's efforts are `purposefully directed' towards residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.[39]
{12}There have been an increasing number of personal
jurisdiction cases involving the Internet. In Zippo Manufacturing Co. v.
Zippo Dot Com,[40] the court found that "the likelihood that personal
jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to
the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the
Internet."[41] Additionally,
in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,[42] the court held
that a company with no physical contacts in the state was subject to personal
jurisdiction because its advertising activities on the Internet and its toll-free
telephone number constituted "purposeful availment."[43] Similarly, in Compuserve, Inc.
v. Patterson,[44] the Sixth Circuit found personal jurisdiction was established
exclusively through Internet contacts.[45] The court "recognized
the ability of the Internet to greatly expand a company's potential market far
beyond a single state's border."[46] Accordingly, the court found the parties' Internet transactions
were substantial enough to satisfy due process requirements and assert personal
jurisdiction.[47] These cases exemplify how readily
courts apply existing due process jurisprudence to the Internet, thus enabling
parties to assert personal jurisdiction.
2.
Due Process and Taxation
{13}Courts have easily adapted the due process analysis for
personal jurisdiction to the state taxation context. The Due Process Clause
"requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state
and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax."[48] Although the
Supreme Court initially applied a physical presence analysis in assessing the
constitutionality of a state's tax machine,[49] it later moved
to the more flexible standard that now predominates in the personal jurisdiction
context.
{14}In Bellas Hess, the Supreme Court
found that since the Missouri mail-order company did not maintain a place of
business or have any agents in Illinois, and its sole contact with the State
was via the mail or common carrier, any law requiring it to collect Illinois
taxes violated the Due Process Clause.[50]
The Court has upheld the power of a State to impose liability upon an out-of-state seller to collect a local use tax in a variety of circumstances. . . . [However,] the Court has never held that a State may impose the duty of use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail.[51]
The Bellas Hess Court recognized the strong
distinction it has made over the years between the physical presence of retail
outlets within a state and companies that only communicate with customers via
mail or common carrier; it found this distinction "a valid one, and we
decline to obliterate it."[52] Thus, the Court
essentially required that an out-of-state vendor have a physical presence in
a state before it is required to collect taxes; the absence of such a presence
would render the state's actions a violation of the Due Process Clause.[53] As discussed below, the Court in
Bellas Hess applied a similar analysis to the question of whether the
state's taxing scheme was consistent with the negative implications of the Commerce
Clause.[54]
{15}Twenty-five years later in Quill,
however, the Supreme Court overruled the portion of the Bellas Hess decision
that required a physical presence for due process purposes.[55] The Court recognized
the evolution of due process jurisprudence and
[i]n that spirit, we have abandoned more formalistic tests that focused on a defendant's `presence' within a State in favor of a more flexible inquiry into whether a defendant's contacts with the forum made it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of Government, to require it to defend the suit in that State.[56]
Thus, under Quill, if an out-of-state vendor
purposely avails itself of the economic benefits of the state, physical presence
is not necessary under the Due Process Clause for the vendor to be subject to
the state's use tax collection requirements.[57]
{16}Since the due process requirements were
considerably weakened in Quill, primarily through the abandonment of
the bright-line physical presence requirement, due process does not pose a significant
obstacle to states implementing collection duties upon out-of-state Internet
vendors.[58] The Commerce Clause remains the primary hurdle for such
state interests.
{17}Once the requirements of the Due Process Clause
are deemed satisfied, courts must consider the constitutionality of state tax
laws under the Commerce Clause.[59] The underlying
concerns of the Commerce Clause are distinct from those of the Due Process Clause.
While the Due Process Clause is concerned with the government treating persons
fairly, the dormant Commerce Clause instead focuses on whether a state regulation
places an undue burden upon interstate commerce.[60]
{18}The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress
shall have power . . . [t]o regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States. . . ."[61] Courts have "consistently held
this language to contain a further, negative command, known as the dormant Commerce
Clause, prohibiting certain state taxation even where Congress has failed to
legislate on the subject."[62] The Supreme
Court has determined it would "jeopardiz[e] the welfare of the Nation as
a whole . . . if [states] were free to place burdens on the flow of commerce
across its borders that commerce wholly within those borders would not bear."[63] Thus, while
the dormant Commerce Clause permits a court to strike down unduly burdensome
regulation, the Commerce Clause itself empowers Congress to either limit[64] or expand[65] states' ability
to pass laws regulating interstate commerce. As a result, Congress can pass
federal legislation enabling states to impose taxes upon electronic commerce
that would otherwise be unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.[66]
{19}In Bellas Hess, in addition to finding
that the state tax regulation violated the Due Process Clause, the Court held
that the state violated the Commerce Clause by requiring a vendor to collect
use taxes from customers when the vendor's only contacts with the state were
by mail or common carrier.[67] In the twenty-five
years between the Supreme Court decisions in Bellas Hess and Quill,
the Court established a four-prong test to help determine whether the dormant
Commerce Clause prohibited a state's imposition of a tax upon an out-of-state
vendor. In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,[68] the Court established
that a tax does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause so long as the tax:
"is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
state, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce,
and is fairly related to services provided by the State."[69] Satisfying the first prong of this
test has been the primary impediment to states' efforts to tax e-commerce.
{20}In Quill, the major issue before
the Court was whether a mail-order company with no offices or representatives
in North Dakota had a "sufficient nexus" with the state to be required
to collect use taxes from its North Dakota customers.[70] The Court recognized that, "it was not the purpose
of the Commerce Clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from
their just share of [the] state tax burden even though it increases the cost
of doing business."[71] Yet, the Court
held that since Quill had no stores or representatives in North Dakota, it did
not have a physical presence within the state, and thus could not be required
to collect use taxes from North Dakota residents.[72] Despite Quill's minimum contacts with North Dakota which
satisfied due process requirements, the tax failed to satisfy the dormant Commerce
Clause requirements.[73] The Supreme
Court agreed with the North Dakota Supreme Court's assessment of dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence as indicating a "retreat from the formalistic constrictions
of a stringent physical presence test in favor of a more flexible substantive
approach."[74] Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court declined to
depart from the Bellas Hess Court's analysis of the dormant Commerce
Clause issue.[75] The Court went on to say that, "although
our Commerce Clause jurisprudence now favors more flexible balancing analyses,
we have never intimated a desire to reject all established `bright line' tests."[76] Accordingly,
in Quill the Court retained Bellas Hess's requirement that an
out-of-state vendor must have a physical presence before it is required to collect
state use taxes; if that physical presence is lacking, the vendor will not have
the requisite "substantial nexus" with the state.
{21}Courts consider numerous factors in ascertaining
whether a vendor is physically present within a state to justify imposition
of sales and use tax collection requirements. The Bellas Hess Court cited
the following as indicative of a lack of physical presence: no place
of business, agents or representatives, tangible property, telephone listing,
or advertising within the state.[77] In Quill, the mail-order
company licensed software to its customers in the taxing state; however, this
alone did not satisfy the requisite "substantial nexus."[78] In both Bellas Hess and Quill, the out-of-state
vendor's only significant contact with the taxing state was via the United States
mail or common carrier, thus the vendors in both cases failed to establish the
physical presence necessary to constitute "substantial nexus."[79]
{22}By separating the constitutional analyses
of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, the Quill Court invited Congress
to intervene using its authority under the Commerce Clause. The Court explicitly
stated that, "while Congress has plenary power to regulate commerce among
the states and thus may authorize state actions that burden interstate commerce,
it does not similarly have the power to regulate violations of the Due Process
Clause."[80] Thus since the two analyses were combined in Bellas
Hess, any legislation Congress would enact would be unconstitutional and
violate the Due Process Clause.[81] The Court recognized
that such a decision not to enact legislation may
have been dictated by respect for our holding in Bellas Hess that the Due Process Clause prohibits States from imposing such taxes, but today we have put that problem to rest. Accordingly, Congress is now free to decide whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.[82]
The dormant Commerce Clause requirements remain the
principal issues of concern to states seeking to require out-of-state vendors
to collect sales and use taxes.
III.THE INAPPLICABILITY OF EXISTING TAX LAWS TO THE INTERNET AND E-COMMERCE
{23}The requirements of the Due Process and Commerce
Clauses remain the primary limitations placed upon states in their efforts to
assess and collect sales and use taxes on purchases made through interstate
commerce. Quill established that the requirements of the Due Process
Clause may be satisfied "irrespective of a corporation's lack of physical
presence in the taxing State." [83]
A state may reasonably impose a use tax collection duty, consistent with the
Due Process Clause, upon any out-of-state vendor that has "minimum contacts"
with the taxing State. These "minimum contacts" may be achieved by
a vendor who has "purposefully directed its activities" at the State[84] or has "engaged
in continuous and widespread solicitation of business within a State."[85]
{24}In contrast to the due process requirements
redefined in Quill, Commerce Clause jurisprudence continues to require
out-of-state vendors to have a physical presence within the taxing state before
the state may constitutionally impose use tax collection duties upon the vendor.[86] The requisite physical presence has been identified by
courts as constituting sales personnel, retail stores, and solicitation of business
by agents within the state.[87]
B. The Inapplicability of Physical Presence to Internet Vendors
{25}The current definition of physical presence makes
it extremely difficult for states to require vendors to collect sales and use
taxes on Internet purchases. Internet companies may generate sales without the
presence of employees or agents within a state. Similarly, their website displays
their products and thus, they do not need stores to market their products. Yet
Internet purchases are analogous to mail-order sales in that tangible purchases
are delivered via the mail or common carrier, thus invoking the application
of Bellas Hess and Quill. However, it may be more difficult to
ascertain the location of the point of sale in the Internet context. Presumably
the point of sale is the state to which the goods are shipped, and thus, the
consumer owes sales taxes to this state. If the Internet company has a "substantial
nexus" with that state, the sales tax will be collected at the point of
sale. Otherwise, the customer will owe a use tax to the state in which the product
is consumed. This inevitably leads to questions as to how an Internet company
establishes physical presence in a state. To date, the same general standards
apply to Internet companies as apply to traditional businesses. The result is
Internet vendors are virtually immune from sales and use tax collection requirements.
This physical presence requirement seems to encourage both mail-order and Internet
companies alike to establish corporate offices, warehouses, and distribution
centers in the five states that do not impose sale taxes.[88]
{26}Internet purchases will become increasingly
appealing to customers as many businesses will lack the requisite tax situs
in most states, and thus the sales tax will not be collected at the point of
sale. States' inability to effectively collect use taxes will enable consumers
to avoid payment of such use taxes. In fairness, while most consumers may not
be aware of their use tax obligations, the resulting effect upon states is the
same--the loss of significant amounts of revenue each year.
{27}Courts have successfully applied existing
laws to the world of Cyberspace in numerous non-tax contexts, including personal
jurisdiction, criminal law, and intellectual property.[89] Jack Goldsmith, a professor at the University of Chicago
Law School and scholar in the field of cyberlaw, believes existing laws can
be successfully applied to Cyberspace, although they may require some tweaking
and slight adaptations.[90] Goldsmith argues
it is legitimate to apply a state's laws to those actions having an effect within
that state.[91] "The medium by which the harm
is transmitted into the regulating jurisdiction be it economic interdependence,
postal mail, wind currents, or the Internet is not relevant to the justification
for regulating it."[92] Applying Goldsmith's theory in the context of e-commerce
suggests that transactions should not be immune from taxation solely because
the sale is conducted through a medium distinct from that of a traditional brick-and-mortar
retailer. Bellas Hess and its progeny requiring a physical presence to
satisfy the dormant Commerce Clause are outdated and not easily applicable to
mail-order and Internet sales. Furthermore, they negate any tax neutrality between
traditional, mail-order, and Internet purchases. If tax neutrality were restored
between traditional purchases and mail-order sales, it would logically follow
that Internet sales should continue to be treated the same as mail-order.
1.
No Longer the Bright-Line Test the Court Envisioned
{28}In Quill, the Supreme Court seemed to
retain the physical presence requirement because it perceived that it would
serve as a bright-line test. As discussed below, however, the Supreme Court's
requirement of a physical presence within a state to constitute a substantial
nexus is no longer the instructive bright-line test it was at the time of its
introduction. In deciding Quill, the Court explicitly stated that "the
bright-line rule of Bellas Hess furthers the ends of the dormant Commerce
Clause."[93] In so ruling, the Court acknowledged that:
[l]ike other bright-line tests, the Bellas Hess rule appears artificial at its edges. . . . This artificiality, however, is more than offset by the benefits of a clear rule. Such a rule firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces litigation concerning those taxes.[94]
However, in his dissenting opinion, Justice White
questioned the clarity of this bright-line test, and asserted that "[r]easonable
minds surely can, and will, differ over what showing is required to make out
a `physical presence' adequate to justify imposing responsibilities for use
tax collection."[95] He suggested that "[t]he majority
clings to the physical presence rule not because of any logical relation to
fairness or any economic rationale related to principles underlying the Commerce
Clause, but simply out of the supposed convenience of having a bright-line rule."[96]
{29}There are many characteristics of the Internet
and electronic commerce that distinguish it from more traditional forms of commerce
and may diminish the effectiveness of this bright-line test. These differences,
such as a lack of dependence on physical location, the irrelevance of geographic
borders, the absence of any central governing entity, the ability of users to
maintain anonymity, and the low cost of entry, have particular importance in
the taxation of electronic commerce.[97] These factors
contribute to states' difficulty in imposing sales and use tax collection duties
upon Internet vendors as a literal physical presence can often be avoided. Given
the "dimness" of this bright-line test in its application to the Internet
and e-commerce, the Supreme Court can no longer cite the benefits of a bright-line
test as a justification for upholding Quill.
{30}The Court has frequently distinguished
Commerce Clause cases on their facts from existing precedent.[98]
However, it insists that, "[a]lthough we have not, in our
review of other types of taxes, articulated the same physical-presence
requirement that Bellas Hess established for sales and
use taxes, that silence does not imply repudiation of the Bellas
Hess rule."[99] Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that,
"while contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not
dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the first
time today," it insisted that "Bellas Hess
is not inconsistent with Complete Auto and our recent cases."[100]
The Court honored established precedent in upholding Bellas
Hess' physical presence requirement to satisfy the dormant
Commerce Clause, despite significant technological advances that
may render such adherence inappropriate.
{31}Courts may continue to limit Quill's application
to sales and use taxes, or they may distinguish Internet and e-commerce cases
involving intangible property from Quill which involved tangible property.[101] However, the end result of many
lower courts distinguishing cases on the facts is that Commerce Clause jurisprudence
no longer connotes a clear answer to state taxation issues. Rather, there is
divisiveness amongst cases and scattered precedent that is often confusing and
difficult to follow. As more and more states attempt to force out-of-state Internet
vendors to collect sales taxes, courts may be forced to draw additional lines
of demarcation and distinguish cases on the facts. As a result, it is becoming
increasingly difficult for individuals and businesses alike to ascertain what
taxes they may owe.
2.
Undue Burden Concerns Should Not Be a Determining Factor
{32}The policy behind the Commerce Clause, that of preventing
undue burden upon interstate commerce, continues to guide courts in determining
the constitutionality of state taxing schemes. In deciding that both the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses were violated in Bellas Hess, the Court
specifically mentioned the 2,300 taxing jurisdictions to which an out-of-state
vendor may be subject.[102] Yet in the lower court's decision in Quill, the
North Dakota Supreme Court identified technological advances in the computer
industry as a modern means of easing the burden of compliance with various state
and local taxing jurisdictions.[103] The court
declined to follow Bellas Hess because "`the tremendous social,
economic, commercial, and legal innovations' of the past quarter-century have
rendered its holding `obsolete.'"[104] However,
the United States Supreme Court rejected these technological advancements as
insufficient to overcome any threatened undue burden. The Supreme Court again
in Quill, as in Bellas Hess, specifically addressed the number
of taxing jurisdictions an out-of-state vendor may ultimately be subject to--over
6,000 in 1992, up from 2,300 in 1967.[105]
{33}Today, the combination of sophisticated software
and the promise of states' simplifying their tax laws ensures that state laws
requiring businesses to collect sales and use taxes will not unduly burden interstate
commerce. These developments suggest that it may be appropriate for courts to
move away from the bright-line physical presence test. Previous notions of undue
burden are no longer determinative as "[t]he Internet along with developments
of software gives the taxman a set of tools that is much more powerful in obtaining
information than anything that's been used in the past."[106]
{34}Additionally, simplification of
the numerous existing tax laws would help appease the courts'
fears of burdening businesses, and hence interstate commerce,
with the responsibilities of collecting and paying taxes to numerous
jurisdictions. Computer software can be modified to enable both
states and businesses to comply with existing laws. Proponents
of simplification argue that "[s]implification of the structure
of the existing `system' is a sine qua non of any solution to
the problem,"[107] and that the real debate is whether such
simplification should be mandatory or voluntary. However, states'
voluntary participation in a simplification plan does seem to
provide the kind of long-term, nationwide solution that is necessary.
{35}Not surprisingly, the major opponents
of Internet taxation are technology companies who have undergone
rapid growth and fear additional taxes will hinder future growth.
"The biggest obstacle to achieving simplification today is
the belief by many Internet businesses that Congress will save
them from taxation. Ironically, technology makes simplification
much more achievable, yet businesses that owe their existence
to technology deny its capabilities when it comes to taxes."
[108]
{36}Despite the objections of the
technology industry, states are leading the initiative towards
simplification. From their standpoint, expending resources now
to create a manageable system is in their own long-term best interests.
They anticipate it will lead to Congressional action permitting
states to collect sales and use taxes on Internet purchases. However,
even among proponents of simplification, different factions are
forming, each with their own view of what form this simplification
should take.[109] Thus, simplification of existing tax
laws may be too idealistic an undertaking that will not produce
immediate results.
{37}Two of the reasons for Quill's
retention of a physical presence standard, the ease of a bright-line
test and the prevention of an undue burden on interstate commerce,
appear to be diminished by an increasingly diverse e-commerce
business and the evolution of modern technology.[110] These advances
both complicate the application of a physical presence standard
to the Internet, and simultaneously, through the imposition of
software, ease concerns that existing tax laws are unduly burdensome
on interstate commerce.
C. Change is Necessary to Achieve Tax Neutrality
{38}Given the increasing dominance of electronic commerce,
and the states' great dependence upon their sales and use taxes as a major source
of revenue,[111] imminent change in existing laws is necessary to ensure
these two competing worlds can successfully coexist.[112] The states'
difficulty in imposing tax collection duties upon out-of-state vendors is a
major obstacle to creating tax neutrality. In addition, the non-physical, intangible
nature of the Internet and electronic commerce renders a physical presence standard
inapplicable to such transactions as it is difficult to identify a physical
presence from most Internet companies' operations. It is inappropriate for the
infrastructure of the Internet itself to constitute physical presence in a state.
For servers may be easily rerouted through other servers, which would presumably
pass through different states, thus negating any physical presence in the original
state.[113] Rendering
this physical presence would create an enormous incentive to route servers through
the states which do not assess sales or use taxes.[114] The current definition of a literal physical presence
of property within the state perpetuates existing inequalities in traditional
commerce between retail and mail-order sales, and extends these inequalities
into the Internet context. Thus, courts should abandon this physical presence
requirement and adopt an economic presence standard which will enable states
to collect sales and use taxes from mail order and Internet purchasers. If the
courts do not address this issue, Congress should act by legislatively overruling
this physical presence standard. Presumably Congress could restore tax neutrality
to all forms of commerce by establishing an economic presence standard that
applies to brick-and mortar, mail-order, and Internet purchases.
1.
Courts Should Abandon Physical Presence Test in Favor of Economic Presence
{39}Economic presence, defined wholly independently
of any physical presence, is easily applicable to the Internet and e-commerce.[115] An out-of-state
seller's actual delivery of goods into a state would satisfy an economic presence
requirement.[116] To protect small businesses, a
de minimis standard must be satisfied before one is subject to tax collection
responsibilities.[117] Factors relevant to an economic
presence analysis include the number of customers in a state, advertising in
the state, and total revenues generated from the state's residents.[118] The addition of these factors to any dormant Commerce
Clause analysis appears logical since a vendor's ability to collect and pay
taxes within a state is related to its sales within the state.[119] "[A] state's ability
to collect use tax does not turn solely upon whether the remote seller maintained
a physical presence in that state."[120] Furthermore,
"in today's economy, physical presence frequently has very little to do
with a transaction a State might seek to tax."[121]
i.
Financial Institutions Analogy
{40}The tax treatment states assert on financial
institutions may be a useful analogy in applying an economic presence standard
to e-commerce. States may tax financial institutions that have a taxable nexus
within the state, so long as such taxation does not violate the Constitution.[122] States have determined that Quill's application
is limited to sales and use taxes, and thus not applicable to financial institutions.[123] As such, states have declined to apply a physical presence
standard, instead opting for an economic presence standard.[124] Such an economic presence focuses on all contacts with
a state, particularly any "economic exploitation" of the state's markets.[125] Economic presence is premised on the belief that the
state's infrastructure "creates and maintains the consumer market and economic
climate that fosters demand for the seller's goods and services."[126] Thus, this same standard could
be successfully applied to e-commerce.
ii.
Geoffrey Decision
{41}Less than a year after the United States Supreme Court
decided Quill, the Supreme Court of South Carolina heard a similar case,
Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n.[127] The distinguishing
feature between the two cases was the type of tax at issue. While Quill
was concerned with use taxes, Geoffrey involved state income taxes. This
difference proved sufficient for the Supreme Court of South Carolina to distinguish
Geoffrey on its facts from Quill, and decline to apply Quill.[128]
{42}Geoffrey, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Toys
R Us, Inc., had no employees or offices within South Carolina.[129] Nonetheless, South Carolina asserted income tax liabilities
on Geoffrey based upon its intangible property within the state, specifically
its trademarks, trade names, and account receivables.[130] The court held that Geoffrey's presence satisfied due
process requirements "by licensing intangibles for use in South Carolina
and receiving income in exchange for their use . . . ."[131] In its dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the Court stated,
"[i]t is well settled that the taxpayer need not have a tangible, physical
presence in a state for income to be taxable there. The presence of intangible
property alone is sufficient to establish nexus."[132]
{43}States have had varying responses to the Geoffrey
decision. Some have legislatively adopted the Geoffrey Doctrine,[133] others have applied the Doctrine without any enabling
legislation,[134] and still other states have rejected the Doctrine altogether.[135] This lack of uniformity erodes the predictability for
businesses engaging in interstate commerce and threatens to undermine the very
purpose of the Commerce Clause. Nonetheless, states are taking the initiative
and applying an economic presence standard precisely because existing case law
is limited to sales and use taxes, and economic presence accounts for the intangible,
transient nature of electronic commerce. This discrepancy between sales and
use taxes versus income and excise taxes needs to be resolved. Presumably, the
same standard should apply to each. An economic presence standard will bring
this uniformity to existing tax schemes and simultaneously, will easily apply
to the emerging electronic commerce industry.
2.
If Courts Do Not Address this Issue, Congress Should Act
{44}Congress's concern about Internet taxation culminated
in the enactment of the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) in October 1998.[136] The ITFA
imposed a three-year moratorium on state and local taxes on Internet access
and on any multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce.[137] Since very few states impose taxes on Internet access,
a permanent moratorium on such taxes is not particularly controversial. However,
what is more problematic to most states is the provision regarding discriminatory
taxes. The ITFA defines a discriminatory tax as: "any tax imposed by a
State or a political subdivision thereof on electronic commerce that is not
generally imposed and legally collectible by such State or such political subdivision
on transactions involving similar property, goods, services, or information
accomplished through other means . . . ."[138] Additionally, the ITFA provides that using an Internet
access provider to create nexus for a remote vendor constitutes a discriminatory
tax.[139] Congress introduced a wide variety
of bills in recent months in efforts to find a permanent solution prior to the
moratorium's expiration on October 21, 2001.[140] The bills varied from seeking to permanently extend various
aspects of the ITFA to simplifying states' tax laws to banning the taxation
of e-commerce.[141] However, no clear consensus emerged
and the ITFA expired without the enactment of any new legislation. On November
15, 2001, the Senate passed the Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act that extends
the moratorium on Internet access taxes, and multiple discriminatory taxes on
Internet commerce, for two years.[142] The Act noticeably excludes discussion
of remote sellers collecting sales taxes on Internet purchases; this remains
a critical, and contentious, issue which Congress must address.
{45}Once courts establish precedent that explicitly
involves electronic commerce, Congress may be more likely to adopt the judicially
created requirements and require their universal application on a national level.
The largest obstacle Congress faces in this pursuit is the various competing
interests, all of whom will be affected by the enactment of any legislation.
Congress itself has little, if anything, to gain from enacting legislation that
permits states to effectively tax a greater percentage of transactions. Thus,
one must doubt the likelihood that Congress will pass the necessary legislation.
However, a perpetuation of the status quo will encourage states to try to expand
the definition of physical presence to areas of electronic commerce, without
violating the Commerce Clause.[143]
{46}"Electronic commerce holds the potential
to drastically increase the penetration of markets by out-of-state vendors with
little or no physical presence in market states."[144] Internet vendors will be free to operate and generate
revenue without incurring obligations to collect sales or use taxes from their
customers. As a result, states will lose an increasing percentage of their tax
base as more business is conducted over the Internet. The dissent in Bellas
Hess notably recognized that "the volume [of sales] which . . . will
be placed in a favored position and exempted from bearing its fair burden of
the collection of state taxes certainly will be substantial, and as state sales
taxes increase, this haven of immunity may well increase in size and importance."[145] Thus, changes
must be made to existing tax laws to accommodate the complexities introduced
by the emerging e-commerce industry. In the electronic commerce context, it
is easier for both states and businesses to determine an economic presence within
a state than a physical one. Such an economic presence standard would place
traditional brick-and-mortar stores on a level playing field with both their
mail-order and Internet competitors, thus creating tax neutrality.[146]
{47}In Quill, Justice White questioned
"the rationality of perpetuating a rule that creates an interstate tax
shelter for one form of business mail-order sellers but no countervailing advantage
for its competitors. If the Commerce Clause was intended to put businesses on
an even playing field, the majority's rule is hardly a way to achieve that goal."[147] Justice White's comments show
significant foresight and his concerns have more than materialized with the
introduction of the Internet and electronic commerce. A physical presence test
first adopted in 1967 and reaffirmed in 1992 is inapplicable to an age in which
transactions may be conducted through an intangible, transient medium. Courts
should reconsider this physical presence requirement and adopt an economic presence
standard that is more readily applicable to both mail-order and Internet sales.
If the courts do not act, it is within Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause to accept the Supreme Court's invitation in Quill and legislatively
overrule the physical presence standard.[148] It is now up to either the courts or Congress to establish
tax neutrality between traditional and electronic commerce and enable states
to collect the sales and use taxes to which they are entitled.
[*]. J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2001; Thomas J. White Scholar,
1999-2001; A.B., College of the Holy Cross, 1998. I am grateful to my mom, Maureen
Lundy, for her unceasing love, support, and inspiration. I would like to thank
Professor Patricia L. Bellia for her invaluable comments and suggestions on
previous drafts of this Note.
[1]. U.S. electronic commerce sales will reach an estimated $108
billion by 2003, comprising 6% of all U.S. retail spending. See R. Todd
Ervin, State Taxation of Financial Institutions: Will Physical Presence or
Economic Presence Win the Day?, 19 VA. TAX REV. 515, 523 n. 30 (2000) (citing Katherine Goncharoff, News
Flash, BUS. WK ONLINE ,
Dec. 7, 1999, at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/dec1999)(article
only available to paid website subscribers; copy on file with author).
[2]. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
[3]. See id. at 311. While Quill actually involved
"use" taxes (discussed infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text),
Quill has also been applied to sales taxes. Cf. infra note 10
and accompanying text. The Quill Court adhered to the Commerce Clause
requirements established in Nat'l Bellas, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue regarding
the collection of sales and use taxes by out-of-state vendors. 386 U.S. 753
(1967).
[4]. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 306 (citing Felt
& Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939)).
[5]. See id. (citing Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
312 U.S. 359 (1941)); John F. Due & John L. Mikesell, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 250-54 (2d ed. 1994).
[6]. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 306 (citing Scripto,
Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960)).
[7]. See VIRGINIA DEPT. OF TAXATION RULING, P.D. 00-53 (Apr. 14, 2000) (determining that a taxpayer
does not have sufficient taxable nexus in a state if using computers to host
web sites serves as its only presence). See also Millennium Enter.
v. Millennium Music, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or. 1999) (holding that a web presence
in a state would not bring a company within the state's jurisdiction under the
Due Process Clause). See generally, Annette Nellen, Overview
to E-Commerce Taxation Guide to Understanding the Current Discussions and Debates
at http://www.cob.sjsu.edu/facstaff/nellen_a/
(Dec. 2000).
[8]. See Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue,
386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967); see also Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S.
340 (1954) (holding that delivery alone is insufficient to require an out-of-state
vendor to collect taxes). However, since Miller Bros. was decided in
1954, three state supreme courts have held that the delivery of goods into a
state, when combined with some form of economic presence, is sufficient for
a state to impose collection duties upon the vendor. See Due, supra
note 5, at 250-54. See also Rowe-Genereux, Inc., v. Vt. Dep't
of Taxes, 411 A.2d 1345 (1980) (holding that delivering goods, advertising,
and retaining security interests in the state qualified the out-of-state vendor
for collection duties); In re Webber Furniture, 290 N.W.2d 865 (S.D.
1980) (holding that this case was distinguishable from Miller Bros. due
to the much greater volume of business conducted in the state compared to Miller
Bros.); Goods Furniture House, Inc., v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 382
N.W.2d 145 (Iowa 1986) (holding that the combination of delivery of goods and
extensive television advertising in the taxing state qualified the vendor for
collection duties).
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on whether an out-of-state vendor's
delivery of goods into a state in which the vendor has some other form of economic
presence may qualify the vendor for collection responsibilities. If this issue
were decided today, the Supreme Court might find that these additional factors
sufficiently distinguish modern cases from the 1954 Miller Bros. decision.
Such a ruling would help restore tax neutrality between traditional brick-and-mortar,
mail-order, and Internet vendors.
[9]. See LETTER RULING 99-1 OF THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPT. OF REVENUE (Jan. 6, 1999) (providing that a vendor's relationship with
a television station, for advertising purposes, created a physical presence
within the state for the vendor). See also Nellen, supra note
7, at 39. In contrast, Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp
295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) involved
a restaurant which was merely placing information about the restaurant on the
website with no opportunity to purchase any goods. The court held that placing
an advertisement on a website did not establish jurisdiction in the courts of
a state where the advertisement is seen. The court pointed out that, "creating
a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide
or even worldwide but without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward
the forum state." Id. at 301.
[10]. Cf. supra note 3 and accompanying text.
[11]. Sales taxes are assessed on "retail sales of tangible
personal property for use or consumption." Megan E. Groves, Tolling
the Information Superhighway: State Sales and Use Taxation of Electronic Commerce,
13 HARV. J. LAW
& TECH. 619, 622 (2000) (quoting PRENTICE HALL, INC.,
PRENTICE HALL'S GUIDE TO SALES AND USE TAXES 57 (1988)). Currently, forty-five states and the District
of Columbia assess sales taxes on items sold within the states' borders and
use taxes on items purchased outside the state by its residents. See
Matthew G. McLaughlin, Comment, The Internet Tax Freedom Act: Congress
Takes a Byte Out of the Net, 48 CATH. U.L. REV. 209, 210 (1998) (citing David C. Blum, Comment, State
and Local Taxing Authorities: Taking More Than Their Fair Share of the Electronic
Information Age, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493, 494 n.6 (1996)). Electronic commerce and emerging
technologies may force states to redefine the types of goods subject to sales
taxes. At present, nineteen states impose sales taxes on the sale of intangible
goods over the Internet, while another sixteen states completely exempt intangible
goods from sales tax. An additional eight states do not tax the downloading
of information from the Internet, but do tax the downloads of software. See
Jeremy Holmes, Taxing Electronic Commerce: Adapting to a New Age, at
http://internetlaw.pf.com/subscribers/html/NewOverview.asp
(last visited Nov. 5, 2001)(article only available to paid website subscribers;
copy on file with author).
[12]. See Groves, supra note 11, at 619 (citing
National Governors' Association Online, Overview of Sales and Use Taxes and
Electronic Commerce, at http://www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/1,1169,C_ISSUE_BRIEF^D_1248,00.html
(Feb. 23, 2001)). These estimated figures are the amount of tax revenues state
and local governments lost due to Internet purchases. In 2000, retail e-commerce
sales were estimated at $25.8 billion, comprising almost 1% of total retail
sales. Fourth quarter sales alone were $8.7 billion, up 67.1% from the fourth
quarter of 1999. These figures exclude financial brokers, travel services, and
concert and other ticket sales, as these are not considered retail. Given the
large presence these three excluded areas have on the Internet, an assessment
of online sales would be considerably higher if these industries were included
in the calculations. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF COMMERCE NEWS, at http://www.census.gov/mrts/www/current.html
(reporting retail e-commerce sales in the fourth quarter of 2000 were $8.7 billion,
up 67.1 percent from the fourth quarter of 1999)(last modified Aug. 30, 2001).
[13]. Use taxes were first enacted in the 1930's to accommodate
for sales tax revenues lost through out-of-state purchases. See Due,
supra note 5, at 245. Since the 1960's, every state imposing sales taxes
also imposed use taxes. See id.
[14]. Steven J. Forte, Use Tax Collection on Internet Purchases:
Should the Mail Order Industry Serve as a Model?, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 203, 206 (1997) (quoting John F. Due & John L. Mikesell,
SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 246 (1981)). See also Charles E. McLure, Jr., Taxation
of Electronic Commerce: Economic Objectives, Technological Constraints, and
Tax Laws, 52 TAX L. REV.
269, 322 (1999) (citing John F. Due & John L. Mikesell, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 1-4 (2d ed. 1994)). The United States Supreme Court has long
since established the constitutionality of use taxes as a tax upon the privilege
of using a product within the state. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,
300 U.S. 577 (1937). "Equal treatment for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers
similarly situated is the condition precedent for a valid use tax on goods imported
from out-of-state." Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of
Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987). See D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S.
24, 32 (1988) (holding that a use tax was validly imposed upon products shipped
into the state since the company had its principal place of business within
the state).
[15]. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430
U.S. 551, 555 (1977) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 614 (1965)).
[16]. See Groves, supra note 11, at 622 (citing
McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944)).
[17]. This disparity is considerably attributable to the fact
that the Internet provides consumers with immediate access to vendors located
in all 50 states, unlike traditional commerce, in which customers are generally
limited to shopping in their own and surrounding states for most purchases.
[18]. Every state that assesses a sales tax upon retail sales
also requires the vendor to collect the tax and remit it to the state. See
Due, supra note 5, at 29.
[19]. A good must be used or consumed within the state before
the state may assess the use tax. See Due, supra note 5,
at 247. However, while this is a rather straight-forward requirement, the limitation
on a state's imposition of use tax collection duties upon out-of-state
vendors is the state's primary obstacle to effective collection.
[20]. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992).
[21]. McLure, supra note 14, at 322. It is notable that
out-of-state vendors who are under no legal obligation to collect use taxes
may voluntarily register to collect these taxes from their customers in order
to relieve customers of their payment obligations. See Due, supra
note 5, at 250. However, few vendors have opted to voluntarily provide this
service.
[22]. The most notable exceptions to this include: required registration
of a good before it can be used within the state, a business taxpayer who may
be audited, and a seller with taxable nexus in the state. See McLure,
supra note 14, at 322-23. All fifty states require taxpayers to pay their
use tax obligations upon the registration of automobiles. The General Accounting
Office estimated that in 2000, immediate use tax compliance by individuals was
less than 5% on automobile purchases. However, since the cars must then be registered,
the use tax is collected upon registration, and as a result, use tax compliance
is virtually 100%. See Nellen, supra note 7, at 53. Not surprisingly,
the threat of being audited compelled 65-80% of businesses to pay the required
use taxes. See id. at 53 (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE GROWTH PRESENTS CHALLENGES; REVENUE LOSSES ARE UNCERTAIN, GAO/GGD/OCE-00-165, June 2000, at 17). Individual consumers
remain the most unlikely to pay use taxes. An increasing number of states, including
Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, and Wisconsin, have added a line
to their individual income tax forms for reporting use tax on mail-order and
Internet purchases. However, the efficacy of such a system is doubtful since
there does not appear to be an effective method for states to fully determine
the use tax owed. See id. at 51 n.108.
[23]. The extent of this confusion is best exemplified by former
House Majority Leader, Dick Armey. "Anybody who seriously tries to push
a `tax the Internet' proposal in this Congress is going to get run out of town.
The American people won't stand for it." Peter Cobb, Transcript: Taxing
E-Commerce: The Landscape of Internet Taxation, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 659, 659 (2000) (quoting Dick Armey, Press Release, Commission
Rejects Net Taxes (Mar. 21, 2000) available at http://freedom.house.gov/library/technology/pr000321.asp).
This exemplifies the myths surrounding an "Internet tax." Many people
believe such a tax would be a "new" tax. State and federal governments
should advance public awareness campaigns to inform people that an Internet
tax actually eases residents' use tax burdens by having vendors collect the
taxes on their behalf. "If there were an efficient way of collecting the
use tax, a lot of the issues that are being hotly debated [regarding an 'Internet
tax'] would not arise." Id. at 662.
[24]. See Nellen, supra note 7, at 53 (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE GROWTH PRESENTS CHALLENGES; REVENUE LOSSES ARE UNCERTAIN, GAO/GGD/OCE-00-165, June 2000, at 19).
[25]. See Robert MacMillan, Sen. Graham Stresses
Need for Net Sales Tax, Newsbytes, at http://newsbytes.com/news/01/163092.html
(Mar. 13, 2001).
[26].
See Groves, supra note 11, at 619 (citing National Governor's
Association Online: Overview of Sales and Use Taxes and Electronic Commerce).
[27]. See DEPT. OF THE TREASURY OFF. OF TAX POL'Y, SELECTED TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, available at http://www.treas.gov/taxpolicy/internet.html
(Nov. 1996). A report issued by the White House in 1996 suggested that "no
tax system should discriminate among types of commerce, nor should it create
incentives that will change the nature or locations of transactions." Brian
S. Masterson, Collecting Sales and Use Tax on Electronic Commerce: E-Confusion
or E-Collection, 79 N.C. L. REV. 203, 220 (2000) (quoting President William J. Clinton &
Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,
available at http://www.iitf.nist.gov/electronic_commerce.htm
(July 1, 1997)). "Neutrality is especially important in the taxation of
electronic commerce, because of the ease with which transactions can be diverted
in response to differential taxation." McLure, supra note 14, at
374.
[28]. McLure, supra note 14, at 374 n.390 (quoting DEPT. OF THE TREASURY OFF. OF TAX POL'Y, SELECTED TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1996) at L-17).
[29]. See discussion infra Part II.C.1 a-b.
[30].U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
[31]. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
[32]. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
[33]. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
[34]. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
[35]. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
[36]. Groves, supra note 11, at 624 (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
[37]. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
[38]. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 307.
[39]. Id. at 308 (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
[40]. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
[41]. Groves, supra note 11, at 626 (quoting Zippo Mfg.
Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
[42]. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
[43]. Id. at 162-63.
[44]. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
[45]. The defendant entered a shareware agreement with Compuserve
to advertise his software, and his only contacts with Ohio, where Compuserve
was headquartered, were via the Internet. See id.
[46]. Gregory A. Ichel, Internet Sounds Death Knell for Use
Taxes: States Continue to Scream over Lost Revenues, 27 SETON
HALL L. REV. 643, 650 (1997) (citing Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89
F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996)).
[47]. See id. (citing Compuserve, Inc., 89 F.3d
at 1263).
[48]. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992) (quoting
Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).
[49]. See Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue,
386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
[50]. Id.
[51]. Id. Out-of-state vendors may be required to collect
sales and use taxes when they have agents or stores located in the taxing State.
See id. at 757 (citing Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306
U.S. 62 (1939); Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941)). See
also supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. Bellas Hess
"created a safe harbor for vendors `whose only connection with customers
in the [taxing] State is by common carrier or the United States mail.'"
Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 315.
[52]. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. at 758.
[53]. See id.
[54]. The Court found that "the test whether a particular
state exaction is such as to invade the exclusive authority of Congress to regulate
trade between the States, and the test for a State's compliance with the requirements
of due process in this area are similar." Id. at 756 (citing
Central R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 621-22 (Black, J., concurring))
(emphasis added).
[55]. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 308. "[T]o
the extent that our decisions have indicated that the Due Process Clause requires
physical presence in a State for the imposition of a duty to collect a use tax,
we overrule those holdings as superseded by developments in the law of due process."
Id.
[56]. Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
[57]. See id. at 307-08.
[58]. See generally McLure, supra note 14.
[59]. "If there is a want of due process to sustain a tax,
by that fact alone any burden the tax imposes on the commerce among states becomes
`undue' and thus violates the Commerce Clause." Quill Corp., 504
U.S. at 305.
[60]. See McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 217 (citing
Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179-84 (1995)). See
also Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 312 (citing Kassel v. Consol. Freightways
Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662 (1981)).
[61]. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
[62]. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175,
179 (1995) (citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)).
[63]. Id. at 180.
[64]. See Groves, supra note 11, at 628 (citing
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 71-72 (1997)).
[65]. See Walter Hellerstein, Deconstructing the Debate
Over State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 13 HARV.
J. LAW
& TECH. 549, 555 (2000) (citing Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin,
328 U.S. 408 (1946)).
[66]. See id. at 555-556. "Congress has plenary
power. . . [to] authorize state actions that burden interstate commerce."
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945)).
[67]. See Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue,
386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
[68]. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
[69]. Id. at 279.
[70]. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 302-03.
[71]. Id. at 310 n.5 (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623-24 (1981)).
[72]. See id. at 311.
[73]. Quill established that "a corporation may have
the 'minimum contacts' with a taxing State as required by the Due Process Clause,
and yet lack the `substantial nexus' with that State as required by the Commerce
Clause." Id. at 313. Thus, "a tax may be consistent with due
process and yet unduly burden interstate commerce." Id. at 313 n.7
(citing Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington, 483 U.S. 232 (1987)).
[74]. Id. at 314 (quoting North Dakota v. Quill, 470 N.W.2d
203, 214 (1991)).
[75]. See id.
[76]. Id. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing
the extent to which this may no longer be the "bright-line" test the
Court once envisioned).
[77]. See Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. 753, 754 (1967).
[78]. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 302 n.1.
[79]. See Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S at 754;
Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 302.
[80]. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 305.
[81]. See McClure, supra note 14, at 324.
[82]. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 318.
[83]. Id. at 308.
[84]. Id.
[85]. Id.
[86]. See discussion supra Part I.B.
[87]. See supra notes 4-6.
[88]. Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon do
not impose sales or use taxes. See McLaughlin, supra note 11,
at 210 (citing David C. Blum, State and Local Taxing Authorities: Taking
More Than Their Fair Share of the Electronic Information Age, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493, 494 n.6 (1996)).
[89]. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F.
Supp. 1119, (W.D. Pa. 1997); United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.
1991); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
[90]. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding
Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 475, 475 (1998).
[91]. See id. at 476-77.
[92]. Id. at 479.
[93]. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 314 (1992).
[94]. Id. at 315.
[95]. Id. at 330-31 (White, J., dissenting). An example
of how Justice White's concern has materialized is evidenced by an Administrative
Ruling in New Mexico, In re Kmart Properties, Inc. (Jan. 2000).
The judge held that "use of a subsidiary's trademark by the parent corporation
was found to establish nexus and tax obligations in New Mexico" for the
subsidiary. Nellen, supra note 7, at 34. The contractual relationship
enables the parties to solicit customers in the state, thus creating the subsequent
revenues New Mexico sought to tax.
[96]. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 329 (White, J., dissenting).
[97]. See Groves, supra note 11, at 919 (citing
Jeffrey Owens, The Tax Man Cometh to Cyberspace, 14 TAX
NOTES INT'L 1833, 1835-36 (1997)).
[98]. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 320 (citing D.H. Holmes
Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 33 (1988)). See also Nat'l Geographic Soc'y
v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 559 (1977)). Additionally, in a 1998
Texas ruling by an Administrative Law Judge, the mere licensing of software
to customers in Texas was sufficient to constitute physical presence for Commerce
Clause purposes. (Hearing 36,237, July 21, 1998) (cited in Nellen, supra
note 7, at 29). The Judge distinguished this case from Quill on the facts,
since "Quill sold property to customers while taxpayer [here] licenses
tangible personal property to customers. Thus, the nature of the transaction
is not the same." Id.
[99]. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 314. The Court reiterated
this fact in saying that "although in our cases subsequent to Bellas
Hess and concerning other types of taxes we have not adopted a similar bright-line,
physical-presence requirement, our reasoning in those cases does not compel
that we now reject the rule that Bellas Hess established in the area
of sales and use taxes." Id. at 317.
[100]. Id. at 311.
[101]. See McLure, supra note 14, at 328.
[102]. See Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue,
386 U.S. 753, 760 n.12 (1967). The Court concluded that,
if the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon National were upheld, the resulting impediments upon the free conduct of its interstate business would be neither imaginary nor remote. . . . The many variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping requirements could entangle National's interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions.
Id.
at 759-60.
[103]. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 303 (citing North
Dakota v. Quill, 470 N.W.2d 203, 215 (1991)).
[104]. Id. at 301 (quoting 470 N.W. 2d at 208). The court
also found that "`wholesale changes' in both the economy and the law made
it inappropriate to follow Bellas Hess today." Id. at 303
(quoting 470 N.W. 2d at 213).
[105]. See id. at 313 n.6 (citing Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc.,
386 U.S. 753). Currently, there are over 7,500 state and local taxing jurisdictions.
See Brian Krebs, Internet Sales Tax Is Nail in Coffin for Dot Coms
McCain, NEWSBYTES, at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/163152.html
(Mar. 14, 2001).
[106]. Cobb, supra note 23, at 666.
[107]. Hellerstein, supra note 65, at 554.
[108]. Stanley R. Arnold, The Internet Tax Debate: Asking the
Correct Questions, 13 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 653, 656 (2000).
[109]. At present, the two major groups leading this effort for
simplification are: the National Conference of Comm'ners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) and the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP). See Nonna A. Noto,
Report for Congress: RL30667: Internet Tax Legislation: Distinguishing Issues,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Nov. 24, 2000). NCCUSL is a non-profit organization that
developed the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). NCCUSL takes a more methodical
approach by analyzing existing statutes and codes and seeking to find areas
where nationwide uniformity may be feasible. The SSTP has two major concerns.
The first is to simplify state and local sales and use taxes amongst the states.
Second, they are researching computer software that may be used to implement
the collection of use taxes on out-of-state vendors. Id. Currently, forty-one
states are participating in the SSTP. See generally, the Streamlined
Sales Tax website, at http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org
(last modified Aug. 2001).
[110]. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
[111]. The amount of sales tax revenue as a percentage of total
tax revenues varies greatly by state. For states such as Connecticut, South
Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas, the sales tax accounts for over half of all tax
revenues collected. See Due, supra note 5, at 18.
[112]. See generally Hellerstein, supra note 65.
Over 170 tax economists and professors of law signed an "Appeal for Fair
and Equal Taxation of Electronic Commerce" which contains four basic principles:
1. Electronic commerce should not permanently be treated
differently from other commerce. . . . Electronic commerce should be taxed neither
more nor less heavily than other commerce.
2. Remote sales, including electronic commerce,
should, to the extent possible, be taxed by the state of destination of sales,
regardless of whether the vendor has a physical presence in the
state. . . .
3. There must be enough simplification of sales
and use taxes to make destination-based taxation of sales feasible. . . .
4. A means must be found to eliminate burdens
of compliance on sellers making only small amounts of sales in a state. . .
.
Id. at 550
(citing Federalism in the Information Age: Internet Tax Issues: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on the Budget, 106th Cong. (2000)).
[113]. See Masterson, supra note 27, at 213.
[114]. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
[115]. See Masterson, supra note 27, at 214 (citing
Charles E. McLure, Jr., Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Economic Objectives,
Technological Constraints, and Tax Laws, 52 Tax L. Rev. 269, 295 (1999)).
[116]. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. A
decision addressing delivery of goods into a state where the vendor has an economic
presence would enable the Court to act in this area without overruling Bellas
Hess or Quill, and simultaneously, restoring the tax neutrality that
has been absent from both mail-order and e-commerce since their inception. See
Due, supra note 5, at 254.
[117]. Such a de minimus standard could be established based upon
an actual dollar amount of sales in the state or as a percentage of a company's
total sales. See McLure, supra note 14, at 400-401. For example,
sales in excess of $1 million may subject a vendor to collection responsibilities
within a state. Or, a de minimus threshold may be satisfied by 5% or more of
a business's total sales being generated in a given state.
[118]. See Masterson, supra note 27, at 215.
[119]. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that "Quill's
`economic presence' in North Dakota depended on services and benefits provided
by the State and therefore generated a `constitutionally sufficient nexus to
justify imposition of the purely administrative duty of collecting and remitting
the use tax.'" Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 304 (1992) (quoting
North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W. 2d. 203, 219 (1991)).
[120]. Masterson, supra note 27, at 215 (emphasis added).
[121]. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 328 (White, J., dissenting).
[122]. See Ervin, supra note 1, at 525.
[123]. See id. at 534. States have adopted an economic
nexus standard for the imposition of state income and franchise taxes upon non-resident
financial institutions.
[124]. See id. at 525-26. Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Tennessee, and West Virginia have enacted such tax
legislation. In Massachusetts, for example, a financial institution has economic
presence when and if it satisfies one of the following three criteria:
has 100 customers in the state, has assets of $100 million attributed to the
state, or has gross receipts of at least $500,000 attributed to the state. See
Craig J. Langstraat and Emily S. Lemmon, Economic Nexus: Legislative Presumption
or Legitimate Proposition?, 14 AKRON TAX J. 1, 10 (1999).
[125]. See Ervin, supra note 1, at 526.
[126]. Id. at 532 (quoting North Dakota v. Quill Corp.,
470 N.W. 2d 203, 218 (1991)).
[127].437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
992 (1993).
[128]. See id. at 18. "Geoffrey's reliance on the physical
presence requirement of Bellas Hess is misplaced." Id.
[129]. See id. at 15.
[130]. See id. at 17.
[131]. Id. at 16. The court added that, "[b]y providing
an orderly society in which Toys R Us conducts business, South Carolina has
made it possible for Geoffrey to earn income . . ." Id. at 18.
[132]. Id. (citing Am. Dairy Queen, Corp. v. Taxation and
Revenue Dep't, 605 P.2d 251, 255 (1979)) (emphasis added).
[133]. A total of ten states, including Arkansas, Florida, Iowa,
Massachusetts, New Jersey and North Carolina, have enacted legislation codifying
Geoffrey's economic nexus standard. See Langstraat, supra
note 124, at 15-16.
[134]. Nine states have pursued an economic presence standard without
legislative action. Such states include: Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Hampshire, and Tennessee. See id. at 16-17.
[135]. Seven states, including Alabama, Michigan, Ohio, and Texas,
have been hesitant to apply this doctrine. See id. at 17-18.
[136]. H.R. 4328, P.L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (The Internet Tax
Freedom Act is part of Titles XI and XII of Division C of the Omnibus Consolidated
and Emergency Appropriations Act of 1999).
[137]. See id. See also generally Annette
Nellen, Federal Internet Tax Freedom Act The Myths and The Realities,
at http://www.cob.sjsu.edu/facstaff/nellen_a/ITFA.html
(Feb. 1999). The ITFA contains a grandfather clause that protects states who
had already implemented a tax on Internet access and allows them to continue
to do so under this moratorium.
[138]. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1104 (2)(A)(i).
[139]. See id. § 1104(2)(iv). See generally
Nellen, supra note 137.
[140]. See, e.g., Internet Tax Moratorium and Equity
Act, S. 512, 107th Cong. (2001) (introduced by Sen. Dorgan, the bill enables
states more freedom in their simplification process in exchange for their right
to collect taxes from out-of state vendors); Internet Tax Nondiscrimination
Act, S.288-IS, 107th Cong. (2001) (introduced by Senators Wyden and Cox, it
permits states to collect from out-of-state vendors if they simplify their tax
systems); The Internet Nondiscrimination Act of 2000, H.R. 3709, 106th Cong.
(2000) (amended version was passed by a House vote of 352 to 75); H.R. 3252,
106th Cong. (2000). See generally Noto, supra note 109.
[141]. See, e.g., The Internet Nondiscrimination
Act of 2000, H.R. 3709, 106th Cong. (2000); Internet Tax Moratorium and Equity
Act, S. 512, 107th Cong. (2001) (introduced by Sen. Dorgan); S. 1611, 106th
Cong. (2000) (introduced by Sen. McCain).
[142]. H.R. 1552, 107th Cong. (2001). This Act extends the Internet
Tax Freedom Act through November 1, 2003. In November 2001, the Senate rejected
an amendment to this Act, introduced by Sens. Mike Enzi, R-Wyo., and Byron Dorgan,
D-ND, that "would have required Congress to either grant or deny states
the Brain Krebs, Senate Passes Two-Year Internet Tax BanUpdate,
Newsbytes, at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/172220.html
(Nov. 15, 2001).
[143]. See Ichel, supra note 46, at 647.
[144]. Langstraat, supra note 124, at 12 (quoting Karl A.
Frieden and Michael E. Porter, The Taxation of Cyberspace: State Tax Issues
Related to the Internet and Electronic Commerce, STATE
TAX NOTES (Nov. 11, 1996)).
[145]. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753,
764 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
[146]. "The preferred solution is to find ways to keep Internet
commerce in the state consumption tax and federal income tax bases, and to bring
mail-order commerce into both tax bases at the same time." J. Clifton Fleming,
Jr., Electronic Commerce and the State and Federal Tax Bases,
2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2000).
[147]. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 329 (1992) (White,
J., dissenting). He added, "we should not adhere to a decision [Bellas
Hess], however right at the time [1967], that by reason of later cases and
economic reality can no longer be rationally justified." Id. at
333 (White, J., dissenting).
[148]. The Quill Court recognized that this issue is one
which "Congress may [not only] be better qualified to resolve, but also
one that Congress has the ultimate power to resolve." Id. at 318.
The Court added that, "Congress remains free to disagree with our conclusions."
Id. (citing Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946)).
Related Browsing
http://ecommercetax.com This site provides news and information about the taxation of e-commerce. It provides practical information as well as policy.
http://www.e-tax.org.uk This site addresses e-commerce taxation from a European perspective, particularly Great Britain.
http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/index/tax.html A site sponsored by John Marshall Law School that has articles, cases, and statutes related to the taxation of e-commerce.
http://www.ecommercecommission.org The site of the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce provides a compilation of reports on e-commerce issues including taxation and other policy concerns.
http://www.ntanet.org The National Tax Associations's webpage that outlines their Communications and Electronic Commerce Tax Project.
http://www.cbpp.org/512webtax.htm The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities website provides a paper discussing the effect of a federal moratorium on Internet commerce taxes.