Lundy, Volume VIII, Issue 2, The Richmond Journal of Law & Technology 
 
Volume VIII, Issue 2,
Fall 2001
 
The Taxation of E-Commerce: 
The Inapplicability of Physical Presence 
Necessitates an Economic Presence Standard 

by: Kathleen P. Lundy[*] 
  
Cite As: Kathleen P. Lundy, The Taxation of E-Commerce: The Inapplicability of 
Physical Presence Necessitates an Economic Presence Standard, 8 RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. 12 (Fall 2001) at http://www.law.richmond.edu/jolt/v8i1/article2.html.
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
  A. The Due Process Clause
    1. Due Process and Personal Jurisdiction
    2. Due Process and Taxation
  B. The Commerce Clause
III. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF EXISTING TAX LAWS TO THE INTERNET AND E-COMMERCE
  A. Existing Law
  B. The Inapplicability of Physical Presence to Internet Vendors
    1. No Longer the Bright-Line Test the Court Envisioned
    2. Undue Burden Concerns Should Not Be a Determining Factor
  C. Change is Necessary to Achieve Tax Neutrality
    1. Courts Should Abandon Physical Presence Test in Favor of Economic 
Presence
      i. Financial Institutions Analogy
      ii. Geoffrey Decision
    2. If Courts Do Not Address this Issue, Congress Should Act
IV. CONCLUSION



I. INTRODUCTION 

{1}The explosive growth of electronic commerce has served as a catalyst for 
immense economic growth.[1] Virtually every aspect of traditional commerce now 
has some presence on the Internet. As such, the way people shop for clothing, 
cars, airline tickets, and even groceries, has been changed forever. However, 
these developments may also have drawbacks. As more and more traditional 
brick-and-mortar stores transfer their operations to the Internet, there are 
many unintended consequences. The traditional infrastructure of retail stores 
may slowly begin to erode. Similarly, jobs in the retail industry may be 
eliminated in favor of more efficient, more cost-effective Internet technology.

{2}Electronic commerce will also directly impact state and local governments as 
their tax laws are not universally applicable to all Internet sales. Under Quill 
Corp. v. North Dakota, [2] an out-of-state vendor must have a physical presence 
in a state before the state may require it to collect sales taxes from its 
customers.[3] Examples of when physical presence has been found include the 
presence of sales personnel, [4] the maintenance of local retail stores, [5] and 
the solicitation of business by independent contractors in the state.[6] Given 
the inherent nature of the Internet, this physical presence requirement 
essentially enables Internet vendors to escape collection requirements in most 
states where they have customers. At present, the only acceptable means by which 
an Internet vendor can establish physical presence is through the existence of a 
warehouse, office, or employees in a given state. Operating a web site[7] or 
shipping goods[8] into a state does not render an Internet vendor physically 
present in a state. Courts disagree as to whether advertising is sufficient to 
create a physical presence within a state.[9]

{3}Since states cannot require vendors without a physical presence to collect 
sales tax,[10] as electronic commerce continues to grow, state and local 
governments will lose an increasing percentage of their sales tax base each 
year.[11] In 1999 alone, states lost $525 million in foregone sales taxes due to 
an inability to collect these taxes on Internet purchases.[12] In other contexts 
where states cannot collect sales taxes for the purchase of goods from 
out-of-state vendors, states instead seek to collect a use tax.[13] Use taxes 
are "imposed upon the storage, use, or consumption of tangible personal property 
within the state, [with] property upon which sales tax has been paid being 
exempt."[14] Such taxes "put local retailers subject to the sales tax on a 
competitive parity with out-of-state retailers exempt from the sales tax."[15]

{4}While the Constitution prohibits sales taxes from being assessed on purchases 
made outside the state's borders,[16] use taxes may in fact be constitutionally 
applied to such purchases, which are then brought into the taxing state for use 
or consumption. These use taxes will become increasingly more important as 
electronic commerce continues to grow and fewer Internet transactions are 
subject to sales taxes as compared to traditional commerce.[17] Unlike sales 
taxes, which are constitutionally restricted in their assessment upon 
purchases,[18] the constitutional limitation upon use taxes primarily arises in 
their collection. An out-of-state vendor must have a taxable nexus with the 
state before it can be required to collect the use tax from the consumer and 
remit it to the state.[19] As in the sales tax context, that nexus only exists 
if the vendor has a physical presence in the state.[20] For example, if a 
consumer purchases goods from either a mail-order or an Internet company, 
neither of whom have a physical presence within the consumer's state of 
residence, a state cannot assess a sales tax or require a vendor to collect a 
use tax on the state's behalf for that purchase.

{5}Because the Constitution limits a state's ability to require vendors to 
collect a use tax on the state's behalf, and not the state's authority to assess 
the use tax on purchases used within the state, states will increasingly assess 
use taxes in circumstances when a vendor lacks the physical presence sufficient 
for the state to require the vendor to collect the sales or use tax. Unless the 
vendor voluntarily collects the use tax, [21] however, it must be collected 
directly from purchasers, thus posing severe collection problems for state and 
local governments. Most states do not have an effective system in place to 
monitor use tax obligations,[22] and thus, the majority of Americans are not 
aware of their duties to pay such use taxes.[23] States would prefer requiring 
out-of-state vendors to collect these use taxes from customers and then remit 
the revenues to the states; since Internet vendors will rarely satisfy the 
physical presence standard in more than a few states, the inherent nature of the 
Internet makes an already difficult collection problem virtually impossible. It 
is estimated that in 2000, state and local governments may have lost as much as 
$9.1 billion in lost use tax revenues, one-third of which is attributable to use 
taxes owed on Internet purchases.[24] By 2003, state and local governments will 
lose an estimated $12.5 billion annually from lost sales taxes[25] and an 
additional $20 billion annually in uncollected use taxes on Internet 
purchases.[26]

{6}It quickly becomes apparent that the existing tax scheme is inherently 
unequal in its tax treatment of traditional commerce versus e-commerce. Taxes on 
traditional commerce are currently assessed and collected more effectively than 
on electronic commerce, thus customers will be increasingly inclined to make 
their purchases through the Internet because of the favorable tax treatment 
afforded to electronic commerce. This result is inconsistent with the principle 
of tax neutrality, that the taxes assessed on goods not impact a consumer's 
decision to purchase goods from a particular vendor through a given medium.[27] 
The current system must be modified to create tax neutrality across all forms of 
commerce, thus treating traditional brick-and-mortar, mail-order, and Internet 
vendors equally. "Ideally, tax rules would not affect economic choices about the 
structure of markets and commercial activity."[28]

{7}This paper argues that the physical presence standard cannot accommodate the 
intricacies of electronic commerce. Under the current legal framework, it will 
be impossible to achieve tax neutrality, because Internet vendors will be able 
to avoid creating the physical presence that triggers tax obligations in most 
states. Courts should abandon the physical presence standard in favor of the 
economic presence standard adopted in other contexts.[29] Such a standard is 
easily applicable to e-commerce transactions and enables states to require 
vendors to collect sales and use tax revenues. Alternatively, if the courts do 
not resolve this issue, Congress is empowered under the Commerce Clause to 
legislatively overrule the physical presence requirement and adopt a standard 
that restores tax neutrality to all forms of commerce. 

{8}Part II discusses the Supreme Court cases addressing the constitutionality of 
the states' application of sales and use tax requirements to out-of-state 
vendors. The Supreme Court has essentially required that a vendor have a 
"substantial nexus" to the taxing state, and has determined that only a physical 
presence satisfies that requirement in the sales and use tax contexts. However, 
the emergence of the Internet has created logistical problems in applying this 
physical presence standard to electronic commerce, and these issues are 
discussed in Part III. Finally, the efficacy of an economic presence is 
analyzed, and ultimately, economic presence is suggested as an alternative to 
the ineffective physical presence requirement. 

II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 

{9}Two provisions of the Constitution limit states' ability to require 
out-of-state vendors to collect sales taxes: the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment[30] and the Commerce Clause in Article I, section 8.[31] 
The Constitutional tests for satisfying these provisions were established well 
before the Internet became commonplace. The two most pertinent cases regarding 
sales and use tax collection by out-of-state vendors, National Bellas Hess v. 
Department of Revenue[32] and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota[33], both involved 
mail-order catalog companies . The Commerce Clause, particularly the negative 
aspects of this clause that limit state regulation, imposes the most significant 
limitations on states' ability to require out-of-state vendors to collect sales 
and use taxes. This Part addresses these Due Process and Commerce Clause 
concerns respectively. 

A. The Due Process Clause 

{10}The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that no 
state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . ."[34] The Due Process Clause "centrally concerns the 
fundamental fairness of governmental activity."[35] When the government action 
at issue is a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over an individual, the 
key question is whether the defendant had adequate notice that his "conduct and 
connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court there."[36] Courts apply this due process analysis used 
in ascertaining personal jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a 
state's taxing scheme under the Due Process Clause.

1. Due Process and Personal Jurisdiction 

{11}To establish personal jurisdiction, a party must have minimum contacts with 
a state "such that the maintenance of a suit does not offend `traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"[37] Due process may be satisfied 
by an out-of-state vendor who "purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an 
economic market in the forum State."[38] The Court has recognized:

    it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial 
    amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications 
    across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a 
    State in which business is conducted. So long as a commercial actor's 
    efforts are `purposefully directed' towards residents of another State, we 
    have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts 
    can defeat personal jurisdiction there.[39]

{12}There have been an increasing number of personal jurisdiction cases 
involving the Internet. In Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com,[40] the 
court found that "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be 
constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality 
of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet."[41] 
Additionally, in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,[42] the court 
held that a company with no physical contacts in the state was subject to 
personal jurisdiction because its advertising activities on the Internet and its 
toll-free telephone number constituted "purposeful availment."[43] Similarly, in 
Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson,[44] the Sixth Circuit found personal jurisdiction 
was established exclusively through Internet contacts.[45] The court "recognized 
the ability of the Internet to greatly expand a company's potential market far 
beyond a single state's border."[46] Accordingly, the court found the parties' 
Internet transactions were substantial enough to satisfy due process 
requirements and assert personal jurisdiction.[47] These cases exemplify how 
readily courts apply existing due process jurisprudence to the Internet, thus 
enabling parties to assert personal jurisdiction. 

2. Due Process and Taxation

{13}Courts have easily adapted the due process analysis for personal 
jurisdiction to the state taxation context. The Due Process Clause "requires 
some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, 
property, or transaction it seeks to tax."[48] Although the Supreme Court 
initially applied a physical presence analysis in assessing the 
constitutionality of a state's tax machine,[49] it later moved to the more 
flexible standard that now predominates in the personal jurisdiction context.

{14}In Bellas Hess, the Supreme Court found that since the Missouri mail-order 
company did not maintain a place of business or have any agents in Illinois, and 
its sole contact with the State was via the mail or common carrier, any law 
requiring it to collect Illinois taxes violated the Due Process Clause.[50] 

  The Court has upheld the power of a State to impose liability upon an 
  out-of-state seller to collect a local use tax in a variety of circumstances. 
  . . . [However,] the Court has never held that a State may impose the duty of 
  use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only connection with 
  customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail.[51]

The Bellas Hess Court recognized the strong distinction it has made over the 
years between the physical presence of retail outlets within a state and 
companies that only communicate with customers via mail or common carrier; it 
found this distinction "a valid one, and we decline to obliterate it."[52] Thus, 
the Court essentially required that an out-of-state vendor have a physical 
presence in a state before it is required to collect taxes; the absence of such 
a presence would render the state's actions a violation of the Due Process 
Clause.[53] As discussed below, the Court in Bellas Hess applied a similar 
analysis to the question of whether the state's taxing scheme was consistent 
with the negative implications of the Commerce Clause.[54]

{15}Twenty-five years later in Quill, however, the Supreme Court overruled the 
portion of the Bellas Hess decision that required a physical presence for due 
process purposes.[55] The Court recognized the evolution of due process 
jurisprudence and 

  [i]n that spirit, we have abandoned more formalistic tests that focused on a 
  defendant's `presence' within a State in favor of a more flexible inquiry into 
  whether a defendant's contacts with the forum made it reasonable, in the 
  context of our federal system of Government, to require it to defend the suit 
  in that State.[56]

Thus, under Quill, if an out-of-state vendor purposely avails itself of the 
economic benefits of the state, physical presence is not necessary under the Due 
Process Clause for the vendor to be subject to the state's use tax collection 
requirements.[57]

{16}Since the due process requirements were considerably weakened in Quill, 
primarily through the abandonment of the bright-line physical presence 
requirement, due process does not pose a significant obstacle to states 
implementing collection duties upon out-of-state Internet vendors.[58] The 
Commerce Clause remains the primary hurdle for such state interests.

B. The Commerce Clause 

{17}Once the requirements of the Due Process Clause are deemed satisfied, courts 
must consider the constitutionality of state tax laws under the Commerce 
Clause.[59] The underlying concerns of the Commerce Clause are distinct from 
those of the Due Process Clause. While the Due Process Clause is concerned with 
the government treating persons fairly, the dormant Commerce Clause instead 
focuses on whether a state regulation places an undue burden upon interstate 
commerce.[60]

{18}The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have power . . . [t]o 
regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States. . . ."[61] 
Courts have "consistently held this language to contain a further, negative 
command, known as the dormant Commerce Clause, prohibiting certain state 
taxation even where Congress has failed to legislate on the subject."[62] The 
Supreme Court has determined it would "jeopardiz[e] the welfare of the Nation as 
a whole . . . if [states] were free to place burdens on the flow of commerce 
across its borders that commerce wholly within those borders would not 
bear."[63] Thus, while the dormant Commerce Clause permits a court to strike 
down unduly burdensome regulation, the Commerce Clause itself empowers Congress 
to either limit[64] or expand[65] states' ability to pass laws regulating 
interstate commerce. As a result, Congress can pass federal legislation enabling 
states to impose taxes upon electronic commerce that would otherwise be 
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.[66] 

{19}In Bellas Hess, in addition to finding that the state tax regulation 
violated the Due Process Clause, the Court held that the state violated the 
Commerce Clause by requiring a vendor to collect use taxes from customers when 
the vendor's only contacts with the state were by mail or common carrier.[67] In 
the twenty-five years between the Supreme Court decisions in Bellas Hess and 
Quill, the Court established a four-prong test to help determine whether the 
dormant Commerce Clause prohibited a state's imposition of a tax upon an 
out-of-state vendor. In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,[68] the Court 
established that a tax does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause so long as 
the tax: "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing 
state, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, 
and is fairly related to services provided by the State."[69] Satisfying the 
first prong of this test has been the primary impediment to states' efforts to 
tax e-commerce. 

{20}In Quill, the major issue before the Court was whether a mail-order company 
with no offices or representatives in North Dakota had a "sufficient nexus" with 
the state to be required to collect use taxes from its North Dakota 
customers.[70] The Court recognized that, "it was not the purpose of the 
Commerce Clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just 
share of [the] state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing 
business."[71] Yet, the Court held that since Quill had no stores or 
representatives in North Dakota, it did not have a physical presence within the 
state, and thus could not be required to collect use taxes from North Dakota 
residents.[72] Despite Quill's minimum contacts with North Dakota which 
satisfied due process requirements, the tax failed to satisfy the dormant 
Commerce Clause requirements.[73] The Supreme Court agreed with the North Dakota 
Supreme Court's assessment of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence as 
indicating a "retreat from the formalistic constrictions of a stringent physical 
presence test in favor of a more flexible substantive approach."[74] 
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court declined to depart from the Bellas 
Hess Court's analysis of the dormant Commerce Clause issue.[75] The Court went 
on to say that, "although our Commerce Clause jurisprudence now favors more 
flexible balancing analyses, we have never intimated a desire to reject all 
established `bright line' tests."[76] Accordingly, in Quill the Court retained 
Bellas Hess's requirement that an out-of-state vendor must have a physical 
presence before it is required to collect state use taxes; if that physical 
presence is lacking, the vendor will not have the requisite "substantial nexus" 
with the state. 

{21}Courts consider numerous factors in ascertaining whether a vendor is 
physically present within a state to justify imposition of sales and use tax 
collection requirements. The Bellas Hess Court cited the following as indicative 
of a lack of physical presence: no place of business, agents or representatives, 
tangible property, telephone listing, or advertising within the state.[77] In 
Quill, the mail-order company licensed software to its customers in the taxing 
state; however, this alone did not satisfy the requisite "substantial 
nexus."[78] In both Bellas Hess and Quill, the out-of-state vendor's only 
significant contact with the taxing state was via the United States mail or 
common carrier, thus the vendors in both cases failed to establish the physical 
presence necessary to constitute "substantial nexus."[79] 

{22}By separating the constitutional analyses of the Due Process and Commerce 
Clauses, the Quill Court invited Congress to intervene using its authority under 
the Commerce Clause. The Court explicitly stated that, "while Congress has 
plenary power to regulate commerce among the states and thus may authorize state 
actions that burden interstate commerce, it does not similarly have the power to 
regulate violations of the Due Process Clause."[80] Thus since the two analyses 
were combined in Bellas Hess, any legislation Congress would enact would be 
unconstitutional and violate the Due Process Clause.[81] The Court recognized 
that such a decision not to enact legislation may 

  have been dictated by respect for our holding in Bellas Hess that the Due 
  Process Clause prohibits States from imposing such taxes, but today we have 
  put that problem to rest. Accordingly, Congress is now free to decide whether, 
  when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order concerns 
  with a duty to collect use taxes.[82]

The dormant Commerce Clause requirements remain the principal issues of concern 
to states seeking to require out-of-state vendors to collect sales and use 
taxes. 

III.THE INAPPLICABILITY OF EXISTING TAX LAWS TO THE INTERNET AND E-COMMERCE

A. Existing Law 

{23}The requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses remain the primary 
limitations placed upon states in their efforts to assess and collect sales and 
use taxes on purchases made through interstate commerce. Quill established that 
the requirements of the Due Process Clause may be satisfied "irrespective of a 
corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing State." [83] A state may 
reasonably impose a use tax collection duty, consistent with the Due Process 
Clause, upon any out-of-state vendor that has "minimum contacts" with the taxing 
State. These "minimum contacts" may be achieved by a vendor who has 
"purposefully directed its activities" at the State[84] or has "engaged in 
continuous and widespread solicitation of business within a State."[85]

{24}In contrast to the due process requirements redefined in Quill, Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence continues to require out-of-state vendors to have a 
physical presence within the taxing state before the state may constitutionally 
impose use tax collection duties upon the vendor.[86] The requisite physical 
presence has been identified by courts as constituting sales personnel, retail 
stores, and solicitation of business by agents within the state.[87]

B. The Inapplicability of Physical Presence to Internet Vendors 

{25}The current definition of physical presence makes it extremely difficult for 
states to require vendors to collect sales and use taxes on Internet purchases. 
Internet companies may generate sales without the presence of employees or 
agents within a state. Similarly, their website displays their products and 
thus, they do not need stores to market their products. Yet Internet purchases 
are analogous to mail-order sales in that tangible purchases are delivered via 
the mail or common carrier, thus invoking the application of Bellas Hess and 
Quill. However, it may be more difficult to ascertain the location of the point 
of sale in the Internet context. Presumably the point of sale is the state to 
which the goods are shipped, and thus, the consumer owes sales taxes to this 
state. If the Internet company has a "substantial nexus" with that state, the 
sales tax will be collected at the point of sale. Otherwise, the customer will 
owe a use tax to the state in which the product is consumed. This inevitably 
leads to questions as to how an Internet company establishes physical presence 
in a state. To date, the same general standards apply to Internet companies as 
apply to traditional businesses. The result is Internet vendors are virtually 
immune from sales and use tax collection requirements. This physical presence 
requirement seems to encourage both mail-order and Internet companies alike to 
establish corporate offices, warehouses, and distribution centers in the five 
states that do not impose sale taxes.[88]

{26}Internet purchases will become increasingly appealing to customers as many 
businesses will lack the requisite tax situs in most states, and thus the sales 
tax will not be collected at the point of sale. States' inability to effectively 
collect use taxes will enable consumers to avoid payment of such use taxes. In 
fairness, while most consumers may not be aware of their use tax obligations, 
the resulting effect upon states is the same--the loss of significant amounts of 
revenue each year.

{27}Courts have successfully applied existing laws to the world of Cyberspace in 
numerous non-tax contexts, including personal jurisdiction, criminal law, and 
intellectual property.[89] Jack Goldsmith, a professor at the University of 
Chicago Law School and scholar in the field of cyberlaw, believes existing laws 
can be successfully applied to Cyberspace, although they may require some 
tweaking and slight adaptations.[90] Goldsmith argues it is legitimate to apply 
a state's laws to those actions having an effect within that state.[91] "The 
medium by which the harm is transmitted into the regulating jurisdiction be it 
economic interdependence, postal mail, wind currents, or the Internet is not 
relevant to the justification for regulating it."[92] Applying Goldsmith's 
theory in the context of e-commerce suggests that transactions should not be 
immune from taxation solely because the sale is conducted through a medium 
distinct from that of a traditional brick-and-mortar retailer. Bellas Hess and 
its progeny requiring a physical presence to satisfy the dormant Commerce Clause 
are outdated and not easily applicable to mail-order and Internet sales. 
Furthermore, they negate any tax neutrality between traditional, mail-order, and 
Internet purchases. If tax neutrality were restored between traditional 
purchases and mail-order sales, it would logically follow that Internet sales 
should continue to be treated the same as mail-order.

1. No Longer the Bright-Line Test the Court Envisioned

{28}In Quill, the Supreme Court seemed to retain the physical presence 
requirement because it perceived that it would serve as a bright-line test. As 
discussed below, however, the Supreme Court's requirement of a physical presence 
within a state to constitute a substantial nexus is no longer the instructive 
bright-line test it was at the time of its introduction. In deciding Quill, the 
Court explicitly stated that "the bright-line rule of Bellas Hess furthers the 
ends of the dormant Commerce Clause."[93] In so ruling, the Court acknowledged 
that: 

  [l]ike other bright-line tests, the Bellas Hess rule appears artificial at its 
  edges. . . . This artificiality, however, is more than offset by the benefits 
  of a clear rule. Such a rule firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate 
  state authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces 
  litigation concerning those taxes.[94]

However, in his dissenting opinion, Justice White questioned the clarity of this 
bright-line test, and asserted that "[r]easonable minds surely can, and will, 
differ over what showing is required to make out a `physical presence' adequate 
to justify imposing responsibilities for use tax collection."[95] He suggested 
that "[t]he majority clings to the physical presence rule not because of any 
logical relation to fairness or any economic rationale related to principles 
underlying the Commerce Clause, but simply out of the supposed convenience of 
having a bright-line rule."[96]

{29}There are many characteristics of the Internet and electronic commerce that 
distinguish it from more traditional forms of commerce and may diminish the 
effectiveness of this bright-line test. These differences, such as a lack of 
dependence on physical location, the irrelevance of geographic borders, the 
absence of any central governing entity, the ability of users to maintain 
anonymity, and the low cost of entry, have particular importance in the taxation 
of electronic commerce.[97] These factors contribute to states' difficulty in 
imposing sales and use tax collection duties upon Internet vendors as a literal 
physical presence can often be avoided. Given the "dimness" of this bright-line 
test in its application to the Internet and e-commerce, the Supreme Court can no 
longer cite the benefits of a bright-line test as a justification for upholding 
Quill. 

{30}The Court has frequently distinguished Commerce Clause cases on their facts 
from existing precedent.[98] However, it insists that, "[a]lthough we have not, 
in our review of other types of taxes, articulated the same physical-presence 
requirement that Bellas Hess established for sales and use taxes, that silence 
does not imply repudiation of the Bellas Hess rule."[99] Furthermore, the Court 
acknowledged that, "while contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not 
dictate the same result were the issue to arise for the first time today," it 
insisted that "Bellas Hess is not inconsistent with Complete Auto and our recent 
cases."[100] The Court honored established precedent in upholding Bellas Hess' 
physical presence requirement to satisfy the dormant Commerce Clause, despite 
significant technological advances that may render such adherence inappropriate. 

{31}Courts may continue to limit Quill's application to sales and use taxes, or 
they may distinguish Internet and e-commerce cases involving intangible property 
from Quill which involved tangible property.[101] However, the end result of 
many lower courts distinguishing cases on the facts is that Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence no longer connotes a clear answer to state taxation issues. 
Rather, there is divisiveness amongst cases and scattered precedent that is 
often confusing and difficult to follow. As more and more states attempt to 
force out-of-state Internet vendors to collect sales taxes, courts may be forced 
to draw additional lines of demarcation and distinguish cases on the facts. As a 
result, it is becoming increasingly difficult for individuals and businesses 
alike to ascertain what taxes they may owe. 

2. Undue Burden Concerns Should Not Be a Determining Factor

{32}The policy behind the Commerce Clause, that of preventing undue burden upon 
interstate commerce, continues to guide courts in determining the 
constitutionality of state taxing schemes. In deciding that both the Due Process 
and Commerce Clauses were violated in Bellas Hess, the Court specifically 
mentioned the 2,300 taxing jurisdictions to which an out-of-state vendor may be 
subject.[102] Yet in the lower court's decision in Quill, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court identified technological advances in the computer industry as a 
modern means of easing the burden of compliance with various state and local 
taxing jurisdictions.[103] The court declined to follow Bellas Hess because 
"`the tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations' of the 
past quarter-century have rendered its holding `obsolete.'"[104] However, the 
United States Supreme Court rejected these technological advancements as 
insufficient to overcome any threatened undue burden. The Supreme Court again in 
Quill, as in Bellas Hess, specifically addressed the number of taxing 
jurisdictions an out-of-state vendor may ultimately be subject to--over 6,000 in 
1992, up from 2,300 in 1967.[105] 

{33}Today, the combination of sophisticated software and the promise of states' 
simplifying their tax laws ensures that state laws requiring businesses to 
collect sales and use taxes will not unduly burden interstate commerce. These 
developments suggest that it may be appropriate for courts to move away from the 
bright-line physical presence test. Previous notions of undue burden are no 
longer determinative as "[t]he Internet along with developments of software 
gives the taxman a set of tools that is much more powerful in obtaining 
information than anything that's been used in the past."[106]

{34}Additionally, simplification of the numerous existing tax laws would help 
appease the courts' fears of burdening businesses, and hence interstate 
commerce, with the responsibilities of collecting and paying taxes to numerous 
jurisdictions. Computer software can be modified to enable both states and 
businesses to comply with existing laws. Proponents of simplification argue that 
"[s]implification of the structure of the existing `system' is a sine qua non of 
any solution to the problem,"[107] and that the real debate is whether such 
simplification should be mandatory or voluntary. However, states' voluntary 
participation in a simplification plan does seem to provide the kind of 
long-term, nationwide solution that is necessary. 

{35}Not surprisingly, the major opponents of Internet taxation are technology 
companies who have undergone rapid growth and fear additional taxes will hinder 
future growth. "The biggest obstacle to achieving simplification today is the 
belief by many Internet businesses that Congress will save them from taxation. 
Ironically, technology makes simplification much more achievable, yet businesses 
that owe their existence to technology deny its capabilities when it comes to 
taxes." [108] 

{36}Despite the objections of the technology industry, states are leading the 
initiative towards simplification. From their standpoint, expending resources 
now to create a manageable system is in their own long-term best interests. They 
anticipate it will lead to Congressional action permitting states to collect 
sales and use taxes on Internet purchases. However, even among proponents of 
simplification, different factions are forming, each with their own view of what 
form this simplification should take.[109] Thus, simplification of existing tax 
laws may be too idealistic an undertaking that will not produce immediate 
results.

{37}Two of the reasons for Quill's retention of a physical presence standard, 
the ease of a bright-line test and the prevention of an undue burden on 
interstate commerce, appear to be diminished by an increasingly diverse 
e-commerce business and the evolution of modern technology.[110] These advances 
both complicate the application of a physical presence standard to the Internet, 
and simultaneously, through the imposition of software, ease concerns that 
existing tax laws are unduly burdensome on interstate commerce.

C. Change is Necessary to Achieve Tax Neutrality 

{38}Given the increasing dominance of electronic commerce, and the states' great 
dependence upon their sales and use taxes as a major source of revenue,[111] 
imminent change in existing laws is necessary to ensure these two competing 
worlds can successfully coexist.[112] The states' difficulty in imposing tax 
collection duties upon out-of-state vendors is a major obstacle to creating tax 
neutrality. In addition, the non-physical, intangible nature of the Internet and 
electronic commerce renders a physical presence standard inapplicable to such 
transactions as it is difficult to identify a physical presence from most 
Internet companies' operations. It is inappropriate for the infrastructure of 
the Internet itself to constitute physical presence in a state. For servers may 
be easily rerouted through other servers, which would presumably pass through 
different states, thus negating any physical presence in the original 
state.[113] Rendering this physical presence would create an enormous incentive 
to route servers through the states which do not assess sales or use taxes.[114] 
The current definition of a literal physical presence of property within the 
state perpetuates existing inequalities in traditional commerce between retail 
and mail-order sales, and extends these inequalities into the Internet context. 
Thus, courts should abandon this physical presence requirement and adopt an 
economic presence standard which will enable states to collect sales and use 
taxes from mail order and Internet purchasers. If the courts do not address this 
issue, Congress should act by legislatively overruling this physical presence 
standard. Presumably Congress could restore tax neutrality to all forms of 
commerce by establishing an economic presence standard that applies to brick-and 
mortar, mail-order, and Internet purchases. 

1. Courts Should Abandon Physical Presence Test in Favor of Economic Presence 

{39}Economic presence, defined wholly independently of any physical presence, is 
easily applicable to the Internet and e-commerce.[115] An out-of-state seller's 
actual delivery of goods into a state would satisfy an economic presence 
requirement.[116] To protect small businesses, a de minimis standard must be 
satisfied before one is subject to tax collection responsibilities.[117] Factors 
relevant to an economic presence analysis include the number of customers in a 
state, advertising in the state, and total revenues generated from the state's 
residents.[118] The addition of these factors to any dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis appears logical since a vendor's ability to collect and pay taxes 
within a state is related to its sales within the state.[119] "[A] state's 
ability to collect use tax does not turn solely upon whether the remote seller 
maintained a physical presence in that state."[120] Furthermore, "in today's 
economy, physical presence frequently has very little to do with a transaction a 
State might seek to tax."[121]

i. Financial Institutions Analogy 

{40}The tax treatment states assert on financial institutions may be a useful 
analogy in applying an economic presence standard to e-commerce. States may tax 
financial institutions that have a taxable nexus within the state, so long as 
such taxation does not violate the Constitution.[122] States have determined 
that Quill's application is limited to sales and use taxes, and thus not 
applicable to financial institutions.[123] As such, states have declined to 
apply a physical presence standard, instead opting for an economic presence 
standard.[124] Such an economic presence focuses on all contacts with a state, 
particularly any "economic exploitation" of the state's markets.[125] Economic 
presence is premised on the belief that the state's infrastructure "creates and 
maintains the consumer market and economic climate that fosters demand for the 
seller's goods and services."[126] Thus, this same standard could be 
successfully applied to e-commerce.

ii. Geoffrey Decision 

{41}Less than a year after the United States Supreme Court decided Quill, the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina heard a similar case, Geoffrey, Inc. v. South 
Carolina Tax Comm'n.[127] The distinguishing feature between the two cases was 
the type of tax at issue. While Quill was concerned with use taxes, Geoffrey 
involved state income taxes. This difference proved sufficient for the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina to distinguish Geoffrey on its facts from Quill, and 
decline to apply Quill.[128] 

{42}Geoffrey, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Toys R Us, Inc., had no 
employees or offices within South Carolina.[129] Nonetheless, South Carolina 
asserted income tax liabilities on Geoffrey based upon its intangible property 
within the state, specifically its trademarks, trade names, and account 
receivables.[130] The court held that Geoffrey's presence satisfied due process 
requirements "by licensing intangibles for use in South Carolina and receiving 
income in exchange for their use . . . ."[131] In its dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis, the Court stated, "[i]t is well settled that the taxpayer need not 
have a tangible, physical presence in a state for income to be taxable there. 
The presence of intangible property alone is sufficient to establish 
nexus."[132]

{43}States have had varying responses to the Geoffrey decision. Some have 
legislatively adopted the Geoffrey Doctrine,[133] others have applied the 
Doctrine without any enabling legislation,[134] and still other states have 
rejected the Doctrine altogether.[135] This lack of uniformity erodes the 
predictability for businesses engaging in interstate commerce and threatens to 
undermine the very purpose of the Commerce Clause. Nonetheless, states are 
taking the initiative and applying an economic presence standard precisely 
because existing case law is limited to sales and use taxes, and economic 
presence accounts for the intangible, transient nature of electronic commerce. 
This discrepancy between sales and use taxes versus income and excise taxes 
needs to be resolved. Presumably, the same standard should apply to each. An 
economic presence standard will bring this uniformity to existing tax schemes 
and simultaneously, will easily apply to the emerging electronic commerce 
industry.

2. If Courts Do Not Address this Issue, Congress Should Act

{44}Congress's concern about Internet taxation culminated in the enactment of 
the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) in October 1998.[136] The ITFA imposed a 
three-year moratorium on state and local taxes on Internet access and on any 
multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce.[137] Since very few 
states impose taxes on Internet access, a permanent moratorium on such taxes is 
not particularly controversial. However, what is more problematic to most states 
is the provision regarding discriminatory taxes. The ITFA defines a 
discriminatory tax as: "any tax imposed by a State or a political subdivision 
thereof on electronic commerce that is not generally imposed and legally 
collectible by such State or such political subdivision on transactions 
involving similar property, goods, services, or information accomplished through 
other means . . . ."[138] Additionally, the ITFA provides that using an Internet 
access provider to create nexus for a remote vendor constitutes a discriminatory 
tax.[139] Congress introduced a wide variety of bills in recent months in 
efforts to find a permanent solution prior to the moratorium's expiration on 
October 21, 2001.[140] The bills varied from seeking to permanently extend 
various aspects of the ITFA to simplifying states' tax laws to banning the 
taxation of e-commerce.[141] However, no clear consensus emerged and the ITFA 
expired without the enactment of any new legislation. On November 15, 2001, the 
Senate passed the Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act that extends the moratorium 
on Internet access taxes, and multiple discriminatory taxes on Internet 
commerce, for two years.[142] The Act noticeably excludes discussion of remote 
sellers collecting sales taxes on Internet purchases; this remains a critical, 
and contentious, issue which Congress must address.

{45}Once courts establish precedent that explicitly involves electronic 
commerce, Congress may be more likely to adopt the judicially created 
requirements and require their universal application on a national level. The 
largest obstacle Congress faces in this pursuit is the various competing 
interests, all of whom will be affected by the enactment of any legislation. 
Congress itself has little, if anything, to gain from enacting legislation that 
permits states to effectively tax a greater percentage of transactions. Thus, 
one must doubt the likelihood that Congress will pass the necessary legislation. 
However, a perpetuation of the status quo will encourage states to try to expand 
the definition of physical presence to areas of electronic commerce, without 
violating the Commerce Clause.[143] 

IV. CONCLUSION 

{46}"Electronic commerce holds the potential to drastically increase the 
penetration of markets by out-of-state vendors with little or no physical 
presence in market states."[144] Internet vendors will be free to operate and 
generate revenue without incurring obligations to collect sales or use taxes 
from their customers. As a result, states will lose an increasing percentage of 
their tax base as more business is conducted over the Internet. The dissent in 
Bellas Hess notably recognized that "the volume [of sales] which . . . will be 
placed in a favored position and exempted from bearing its fair burden of the 
collection of state taxes certainly will be substantial, and as state sales 
taxes increase, this haven of immunity may well increase in size and 
importance."[145] Thus, changes must be made to existing tax laws to accommodate 
the complexities introduced by the emerging e-commerce industry. In the 
electronic commerce context, it is easier for both states and businesses to 
determine an economic presence within a state than a physical one. Such an 
economic presence standard would place traditional brick-and-mortar stores on a 
level playing field with both their mail-order and Internet competitors, thus 
creating tax neutrality.[146]

{47}In Quill, Justice White questioned "the rationality of perpetuating a rule 
that creates an interstate tax shelter for one form of business mail-order 
sellers but no countervailing advantage for its competitors. If the Commerce 
Clause was intended to put businesses on an even playing field, the majority's 
rule is hardly a way to achieve that goal."[147] Justice White's comments show 
significant foresight and his concerns have more than materialized with the 
introduction of the Internet and electronic commerce. A physical presence test 
first adopted in 1967 and reaffirmed in 1992 is inapplicable to an age in which 
transactions may be conducted through an intangible, transient medium. Courts 
should reconsider this physical presence requirement and adopt an economic 
presence standard that is more readily applicable to both mail-order and 
Internet sales. If the courts do not act, it is within Congress's authority 
under the Commerce Clause to accept the Supreme Court's invitation in Quill and 
legislatively overrule the physical presence standard.[148] It is now up to 
either the courts or Congress to establish tax neutrality between traditional 
and electronic commerce and enable states to collect the sales and use taxes to 
which they are entitled.



ENDNOTES

[*]. J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2001; Thomas J. White Scholar, 1999-2001; 
A.B., College of the Holy Cross, 1998. I am grateful to my mom, Maureen Lundy, 
for her unceasing love, support, and inspiration. I would like to thank 
Professor Patricia L. Bellia for her invaluable comments and suggestions on 
previous drafts of this Note. 

[1]. U.S. electronic commerce sales will reach an estimated $108 billion by 
2003, comprising 6% of all U.S. retail spending. See R. Todd Ervin, State 
Taxation of Financial Institutions: Will Physical Presence or Economic Presence 
Win the Day?, 19 VA. TAX REV. 515, 523 n. 30 (2000) (citing Katherine 
Goncharoff, News Flash, BUS. WK ONLINE , Dec. 7, 1999, at 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/dec1999)(article only available to 
paid website subscribers; copy on file with author). 

[2]. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).

[3]. See id. at 311. While Quill actually involved "use" taxes (discussed infra 
notes 13-15 and accompanying text), Quill has also been applied to sales taxes. 
Cf. infra note 10 and accompanying text. The Quill Court adhered to the Commerce 
Clause requirements established in Nat'l Bellas, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue 
regarding the collection of sales and use taxes by out-of-state vendors. 386 
U.S. 753 (1967).

[4]. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 306 (citing Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. 
Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939)).

[5]. See id. (citing Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941)); John 
F. Due & John L. Mikesell, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL STRUCTURE AND 
ADMINISTRATION 250-54 (2d ed. 1994). 

[6]. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 306 (citing Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 
207 (1960)).

[7]. See VIRGINIA DEPT. OF TAXATION RULING, P.D. 00-53 (Apr. 14, 2000) 
(determining that a taxpayer does not have sufficient taxable nexus in a state 
if using computers to host web sites serves as its only presence). See also 
Millennium Enter. v. Millennium Music, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or. 1999) (holding 
that a web presence in a state would not bring a company within the state's 
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause). See generally, Annette Nellen, 
Overview to E-Commerce Taxation Guide to Understanding the Current Discussions 
and Debates at http://www.cob.sjsu.edu/facstaff/nellen_a/ (Dec. 2000). 

[8]. See Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967); 
see also Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954) (holding that delivery 
alone is insufficient to require an out-of-state vendor to collect taxes). 
However, since Miller Bros. was decided in 1954, three state supreme courts have 
held that the delivery of goods into a state, when combined with some form of 
economic presence, is sufficient for a state to impose collection duties upon 
the vendor. See Due, supra note 5, at 250-54. See also Rowe-Genereux, Inc., v. 
Vt. Dep't of Taxes, 411 A.2d 1345 (1980) (holding that delivering goods, 
advertising, and retaining security interests in the state qualified the 
out-of-state vendor for collection duties); In re Webber Furniture, 290 N.W.2d 
865 (S.D. 1980) (holding that this case was distinguishable from Miller Bros. 
due to the much greater volume of business conducted in the state compared to 
Miller Bros.); Goods Furniture House, Inc., v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 382 
N.W.2d 145 (Iowa 1986) (holding that the combination of delivery of goods and 
extensive television advertising in the taxing state qualified the vendor for 
collection duties). 
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on whether an out-of-state 
vendor's delivery of goods into a state in which the vendor has some other form 
of economic presence may qualify the vendor for collection responsibilities. If 
this issue were decided today, the Supreme Court might find that these 
additional factors sufficiently distinguish modern cases from the 1954 Miller 
Bros. decision. Such a ruling would help restore tax neutrality between 
traditional brick-and-mortar, mail-order, and Internet vendors.

[9]. See LETTER RULING 99-1 OF THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPT. OF REVENUE (Jan. 6, 1999) 
(providing that a vendor's relationship with a television station, for 
advertising purposes, created a physical presence within the state for the 
vendor). See also Nellen, supra note 7, at 39. In contrast, Bensusan Restaurant 
Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 
1997) involved a restaurant which was merely placing information about the 
restaurant on the website with no opportunity to purchase any goods. The court 
held that placing an advertisement on a website did not establish jurisdiction 
in the courts of a state where the advertisement is seen. The court pointed out 
that, "creating a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may 
be felt nationwide or even worldwide but without more, it is not an act 
purposefully directed toward the forum state." Id. at 301.

[10]. Cf. supra note 3 and accompanying text.

[11]. Sales taxes are assessed on "retail sales of tangible personal property 
for use or consumption." Megan E. Groves, Tolling the Information Superhighway: 
State Sales and Use Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 13 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 
619, 622 (2000) (quoting PRENTICE HALL, INC., PRENTICE HALL'S GUIDE TO SALES AND 
USE TAXES 57 (1988)). Currently, forty-five states and the District of Columbia 
assess sales taxes on items sold within the states' borders and use taxes on 
items purchased outside the state by its residents. See Matthew G. McLaughlin, 
Comment, The Internet Tax Freedom Act: Congress Takes a Byte Out of the Net, 48 
CATH. U.L. REV. 209, 210 (1998) (citing David C. Blum, Comment, State and Local 
Taxing Authorities: Taking More Than Their Fair Share of the Electronic 
Information Age, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493, 494 n.6 (1996)). 
Electronic commerce and emerging technologies may force states to redefine the 
types of goods subject to sales taxes. At present, nineteen states impose sales 
taxes on the sale of intangible goods over the Internet, while another sixteen 
states completely exempt intangible goods from sales tax. An additional eight 
states do not tax the downloading of information from the Internet, but do tax 
the downloads of software. See Jeremy Holmes, Taxing Electronic Commerce: 
Adapting to a New Age, at 
http://internetlaw.pf.com/subscribers/html/NewOverview.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 
2001)(article only available to paid website subscribers; copy on file with 
author).

[12]. See Groves, supra note 11, at 619 (citing National Governors' Association 
Online, Overview of Sales and Use Taxes and Electronic Commerce, at 
http://www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/1,1169,C_ISSUE_BRIEF^D_1248,00.html 
(Feb. 23, 2001)). These estimated figures are the amount of tax revenues state 
and local governments lost due to Internet purchases. In 2000, retail e-commerce 
sales were estimated at $25.8 billion, comprising almost 1% of total retail 
sales. Fourth quarter sales alone were $8.7 billion, up 67.1% from the fourth 
quarter of 1999. These figures exclude financial brokers, travel services, and 
concert and other ticket sales, as these are not considered retail. Given the 
large presence these three excluded areas have on the Internet, an assessment of 
online sales would be considerably higher if these industries were included in 
the calculations. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF COMMERCE NEWS, 
at http://www.census.gov/mrts/www/current.html (reporting retail e-commerce 
sales in the fourth quarter of 2000 were $8.7 billion, up 67.1 percent from the 
fourth quarter of 1999)(last modified Aug. 30, 2001).

[13]. Use taxes were first enacted in the 1930's to accommodate for sales tax 
revenues lost through out-of-state purchases. See Due, supra note 5, at 245. 
Since the 1960's, every state imposing sales taxes also imposed use taxes. See 
id.

[14]. Steven J. Forte, Use Tax Collection on Internet Purchases: Should the Mail 
Order Industry Serve as a Model?, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 203, 206 
(1997) (quoting John F. Due & John L. Mikesell, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL 
STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 246 (1981)). See also Charles E. McLure, Jr., 
Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Economic Objectives, Technological Constraints, 
and Tax Laws, 52 TAX L. REV. 269, 322 (1999) (citing John F. Due & John L. 
Mikesell, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 1-4 (2d 
ed. 1994)). The United States Supreme Court has long since established the 
constitutionality of use taxes as a tax upon the privilege of using a product 
within the state. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937). "Equal 
treatment for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers similarly situated is the 
condition precedent for a valid use tax on goods imported from out-of-state." 
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 
(1987). See D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 32 (1988) (holding that a 
use tax was validly imposed upon products shipped into the state since the 
company had its principal place of business within the state).

[15]. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 555 
(1977) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 614 (1965)).

[16]. See Groves, supra note 11, at 622 (citing McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 
U.S. 327, 330 (1944)). 

[17]. This disparity is considerably attributable to the fact that the Internet 
provides consumers with immediate access to vendors located in all 50 states, 
unlike traditional commerce, in which customers are generally limited to 
shopping in their own and surrounding states for most purchases.

[18]. Every state that assesses a sales tax upon retail sales also requires the 
vendor to collect the tax and remit it to the state. See Due, supra note 5, at 
29.

[19]. A good must be used or consumed within the state before the state may 
assess the use tax. See Due, supra note 5, at 247. However, while this is a 
rather straight-forward requirement, the limitation on a state's imposition of 
use tax collection duties upon out-of-state vendors is the state's primary 
obstacle to effective collection.

[20]. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992).

[21]. McLure, supra note 14, at 322. It is notable that out-of-state vendors who 
are under no legal obligation to collect use taxes may voluntarily register to 
collect these taxes from their customers in order to relieve customers of their 
payment obligations. See Due, supra note 5, at 250. However, few vendors have 
opted to voluntarily provide this service.

[22]. The most notable exceptions to this include: required registration of a 
good before it can be used within the state, a business taxpayer who may be 
audited, and a seller with taxable nexus in the state. See McLure, supra note 
14, at 322-23. All fifty states require taxpayers to pay their use tax 
obligations upon the registration of automobiles. The General Accounting Office 
estimated that in 2000, immediate use tax compliance by individuals was less 
than 5% on automobile purchases. However, since the cars must then be 
registered, the use tax is collected upon registration, and as a result, use tax 
compliance is virtually 100%. See Nellen, supra note 7, at 53. Not surprisingly, 
the threat of being audited compelled 65-80% of businesses to pay the required 
use taxes. See id. at 53 (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 
GROWTH PRESENTS CHALLENGES; REVENUE LOSSES ARE UNCERTAIN, GAO/GGD/OCE-00-165, 
June 2000, at 17). Individual consumers remain the most unlikely to pay use 
taxes. An increasing number of states, including Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Maine, and Wisconsin, have added a line to their individual income tax 
forms for reporting use tax on mail-order and Internet purchases. However, the 
efficacy of such a system is doubtful since there does not appear to be an 
effective method for states to fully determine the use tax owed. See id. at 51 
n.108.

[23]. The extent of this confusion is best exemplified by former House Majority 
Leader, Dick Armey. "Anybody who seriously tries to push a `tax the Internet' 
proposal in this Congress is going to get run out of town. The American people 
won't stand for it." Peter Cobb, Transcript: Taxing E-Commerce: The Landscape of 
Internet Taxation, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 659, 659 (2000) (quoting Dick 
Armey, Press Release, Commission Rejects Net Taxes (Mar. 21, 2000) available at 
http://freedom.house.gov/library/technology/pr000321.asp). This exemplifies the 
myths surrounding an "Internet tax." Many people believe such a tax would be a 
"new" tax. State and federal governments should advance public awareness 
campaigns to inform people that an Internet tax actually eases residents' use 
tax burdens by having vendors collect the taxes on their behalf. "If there were 
an efficient way of collecting the use tax, a lot of the issues that are being 
hotly debated [regarding an 'Internet tax'] would not arise." Id. at 662.

[24]. See Nellen, supra note 7, at 53 (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE GROWTH PRESENTS CHALLENGES; REVENUE LOSSES ARE UNCERTAIN, 
GAO/GGD/OCE-00-165, June 2000, at 19).

[25]. See Robert MacMillan, Sen. Graham Stresses Need for Net Sales Tax, 
Newsbytes, at http://newsbytes.com/news/01/163092.html (Mar. 13, 2001).

[26]. See Groves, supra note 11, at 619 (citing National Governor's Association 
Online: Overview of Sales and Use Taxes and Electronic Commerce).

[27]. See DEPT. OF THE TREASURY OFF. OF TAX POL'Y, SELECTED TAX POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, available at 
http://www.treas.gov/taxpolicy/internet.html (Nov. 1996). A report issued by the 
White House in 1996 suggested that "no tax system should discriminate among 
types of commerce, nor should it create incentives that will change the nature 
or locations of transactions." Brian S. Masterson, Collecting Sales and Use Tax 
on Electronic Commerce: E-Confusion or E-Collection, 79 N.C. L. REV. 203, 220 
(2000) (quoting President William J. Clinton & Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., 
A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, available at 
http://www.iitf.nist.gov/electronic_commerce.htm (July 1, 1997)). "Neutrality is 
especially important in the taxation of electronic commerce, because of the ease 
with which transactions can be diverted in response to differential taxation." 
McLure, supra note 14, at 374. 

[28]. McLure, supra note 14, at 374 n.390 (quoting DEPT. OF THE TREASURY OFF. OF 
TAX POL'Y, SELECTED TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1996) 
at L-17).

[29]. See discussion infra Part II.C.1 a-b.

[30].U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

[31]. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

[32]. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).

[33]. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).

[34]. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

[35]. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992). 

[36]. Groves, supra note 11, at 624 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). 

[37]. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 

[38]. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 307. 

[39]. Id. at 308 (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)). 

[40]. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).

[41]. Groves, supra note 11, at 626 (quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 
Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).

[42]. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). 

[43]. Id. at 162-63.

[44]. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).

[45]. The defendant entered a shareware agreement with Compuserve to advertise 
his software, and his only contacts with Ohio, where Compuserve was 
headquartered, were via the Internet. See id. 

[46]. Gregory A. Ichel, Internet Sounds Death Knell for Use Taxes: States 
Continue to Scream over Lost Revenues, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 643, 650 (1997) 
(citing Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996)).

[47]. See id. (citing Compuserve, Inc., 89 F.3d at 1263).

[48]. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992) (quoting Miller 
Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)). 

[49]. See Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).

[50]. Id.

[51]. Id. Out-of-state vendors may be required to collect sales and use taxes 
when they have agents or stores located in the taxing State. See id. at 757 
(citing Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939); Nelson v. 
Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941)). See also supra notes 4-6 and 
accompanying text. Bellas Hess "created a safe harbor for vendors `whose only 
connection with customers in the [taxing] State is by common carrier or the 
United States mail.'" Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 315.

[52]. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. at 758.

[53]. See id.

[54]. The Court found that "the test whether a particular state exaction is such 
as to invade the exclusive authority of Congress to regulate trade between the 
States, and the test for a State's compliance with the requirements of due 
process in this area are similar." Id. at 756 (citing Central R. Co. v. 
Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 621-22 (Black, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).

[55]. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 308. "[T]o the extent that our decisions have 
indicated that the Due Process Clause requires physical presence in a State for 
the imposition of a duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those holdings as 
superseded by developments in the law of due process." Id.

[56]. Id. at 307 (emphasis added). 

[57]. See id. at 307-08.

[58]. See generally McLure, supra note 14.

[59]. "If there is a want of due process to sustain a tax, by that fact alone 
any burden the tax imposes on the commerce among states becomes `undue' and thus 
violates the Commerce Clause." Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 305. 

[60]. See McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 217 (citing Okla. Tax Comm'n v. 
Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179-84 (1995)). See also Quill Corp., 504 
U.S. at 312 (citing Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662 
(1981)).

[61]. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 

[62]. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995) 
(citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)).

[63]. Id. at 180.

[64]. See Groves, supra note 11, at 628 (citing Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. 
Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 71-72 (1997)).

[65]. See Walter Hellerstein, Deconstructing the Debate Over State Taxation of 
Electronic Commerce, 13 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 549, 555 (2000) (citing Prudential 
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946)). 

[66]. See id. at 555-556. "Congress has plenary power. . . [to] authorize state 
actions that burden interstate commerce." Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 
298, 305 (1992) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 
(1945)). 

[67]. See Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).

[68]. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 

[69]. Id. at 279.

[70]. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 302-03. 

[71]. Id. at 310 n.5 (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 
623-24 (1981)). 

[72]. See id. at 311.

[73]. Quill established that "a corporation may have the 'minimum contacts' with 
a taxing State as required by the Due Process Clause, and yet lack the 
`substantial nexus' with that State as required by the Commerce Clause." Id. at 
313. Thus, "a tax may be consistent with due process and yet unduly burden 
interstate commerce." Id. at 313 n.7 (citing Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. 
Washington, 483 U.S. 232 (1987)).

[74]. Id. at 314 (quoting North Dakota v. Quill, 470 N.W.2d 203, 214 (1991)).

[75]. See id.

[76]. Id. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the extent to which this may no 
longer be the "bright-line" test the Court once envisioned). 

[77]. See Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. 753, 754 (1967).

[78]. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 302 n.1. 

[79]. See Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S at 754; Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 302.

[80]. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 305.

[81]. See McClure, supra note 14, at 324.

[82]. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 318.

[83]. Id. at 308.

[84]. Id.

[85]. Id.

[86]. See discussion supra Part I.B.

[87]. See supra notes 4-6.

[88]. Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon do not impose sales 
or use taxes. See McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 210 (citing David C. Blum, State 
and Local Taxing Authorities: Taking More Than Their Fair Share of the 
Electronic Information Age, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493, 494 n.6 
(1996)). 

[89]. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. 1119, (W.D. Pa. 
1997); United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991); Panavision Int'l, 
L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 

[90]. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of 
Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 475, 475 (1998).

[91]. See id. at 476-77.

[92]. Id. at 479.

[93]. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 314 (1992).

[94]. Id. at 315.

[95]. Id. at 330-31 (White, J., dissenting). An example of how Justice White's 
concern has materialized is evidenced by an Administrative Ruling in New Mexico, 
In re Kmart Properties, Inc. (Jan. 2000). The judge held that "use of a 
subsidiary's trademark by the parent corporation was found to establish nexus 
and tax obligations in New Mexico" for the subsidiary. Nellen, supra note 7, at 
34. The contractual relationship enables the parties to solicit customers in the 
state, thus creating the subsequent revenues New Mexico sought to tax.

[96]. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 329 (White, J., dissenting).

[97]. See Groves, supra note 11, at 919 (citing Jeffrey Owens, The Tax Man 
Cometh to Cyberspace, 14 TAX NOTES INT'L 1833, 1835-36 (1997)).

[98]. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 320 (citing D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 
U.S. 24, 33 (1988)). See also Nat'l Geographic Soc'y v. Cal. Bd. of 
Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 559 (1977)). Additionally, in a 1998 Texas ruling by 
an Administrative Law Judge, the mere licensing of software to customers in 
Texas was sufficient to constitute physical presence for Commerce Clause 
purposes. (Hearing 36,237, July 21, 1998) (cited in Nellen, supra note 7, at 
29). The Judge distinguished this case from Quill on the facts, since "Quill 
sold property to customers while taxpayer [here] licenses tangible personal 
property to customers. Thus, the nature of the transaction is not the same." Id.

[99]. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 314. The Court reiterated this fact in saying 
that "although in our cases subsequent to Bellas Hess and concerning other types 
of taxes we have not adopted a similar bright-line, physical-presence 
requirement, our reasoning in those cases does not compel that we now reject the 
rule that Bellas Hess established in the area of sales and use taxes." Id. at 
317.

[100]. Id. at 311.

[101]. See McLure, supra note 14, at 328.

[102]. See Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 760 n.12 
(1967). The Court concluded that, 

    if the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon National were 
    upheld, the resulting impediments upon the free conduct of its interstate 
    business would be neither imaginary nor remote. . . . The many variations in 
    rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and 
    record-keeping requirements could entangle National's interstate business in 
    a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdictions.
Id. at 759-60.

[103]. See Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 303 (citing North Dakota v. Quill, 470 
N.W.2d 203, 215 (1991)).

[104]. Id. at 301 (quoting 470 N.W. 2d at 208). The court also found that 
"`wholesale changes' in both the economy and the law made it inappropriate to 
follow Bellas Hess today." Id. at 303 (quoting 470 N.W. 2d at 213).

[105]. See id. at 313 n.6 (citing Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. 753). 
Currently, there are over 7,500 state and local taxing jurisdictions. See Brian 
Krebs, Internet Sales Tax Is Nail in Coffin for Dot Coms McCain, NEWSBYTES, at 
http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/163152.html (Mar. 14, 2001). 

[106]. Cobb, supra note 23, at 666.

[107]. Hellerstein, supra note 65, at 554.

[108]. Stanley R. Arnold, The Internet Tax Debate: Asking the Correct Questions, 
13 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 653, 656 (2000).

[109]. At present, the two major groups leading this effort for simplification 
are: the National Conference of Comm'ners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the 
Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP). See Nonna A. Noto, Report for Congress: 
RL30667: Internet Tax Legislation: Distinguishing Issues, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE (Nov. 24, 2000). NCCUSL is a non-profit organization that developed the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). NCCUSL takes a more methodical approach by 
analyzing existing statutes and codes and seeking to find areas where nationwide 
uniformity may be feasible. The SSTP has two major concerns. The first is to 
simplify state and local sales and use taxes amongst the states. Second, they 
are researching computer software that may be used to implement the collection 
of use taxes on out-of-state vendors. Id. Currently, forty-one states are 
participating in the SSTP. See generally, the Streamlined Sales Tax website, at 
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org (last modified Aug. 2001).

[110]. See infra Part II.B.1-2.

[111]. The amount of sales tax revenue as a percentage of total tax revenues 
varies greatly by state. For states such as Connecticut, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, and Texas, the sales tax accounts for over half of all tax revenues 
collected. See Due, supra note 5, at 18.

[112]. See generally Hellerstein, supra note 65. Over 170 tax economists and 
professors of law signed an "Appeal for Fair and Equal Taxation of Electronic 
Commerce" which contains four basic principles: 
1. Electronic commerce should not permanently be treated differently from other 
commerce. . . . Electronic commerce should be taxed neither more nor less 
heavily than other commerce.
2. Remote sales, including electronic commerce, should, to the extent possible, 
be taxed by the state of destination of sales, regardless of whether the vendor 
has a physical presence in the state. . . .
3. There must be enough simplification of sales and use taxes to make 
destination-based taxation of sales feasible. . . .
4. A means must be found to eliminate burdens of compliance on sellers making 
only small amounts of sales in a state. . . .
Id. at 550 (citing Federalism in the Information Age: Internet Tax Issues: 
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Budget, 106th Cong. (2000)). 

[113]. See Masterson, supra note 27, at 213.

[114]. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 

[115]. See Masterson, supra note 27, at 214 (citing Charles E. McLure, Jr., 
Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Economic Objectives, Technological Constraints, 
and Tax Laws, 52 Tax L. Rev. 269, 295 (1999)). 

[116]. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. A decision addressing delivery of 
goods into a state where the vendor has an economic presence would enable the 
Court to act in this area without overruling Bellas Hess or Quill, and 
simultaneously, restoring the tax neutrality that has been absent from both 
mail-order and e-commerce since their inception. See Due, supra note 5, at 254. 

[117]. Such a de minimus standard could be established based upon an actual 
dollar amount of sales in the state or as a percentage of a company's total 
sales. See McLure, supra note 14, at 400-401. For example, sales in excess of $1 
million may subject a vendor to collection responsibilities within a state. Or, 
a de minimus threshold may be satisfied by 5% or more of a business's total 
sales being generated in a given state.

[118]. See Masterson, supra note 27, at 215.

[119]. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that "Quill's `economic presence' in 
North Dakota depended on services and benefits provided by the State and 
therefore generated a `constitutionally sufficient nexus to justify imposition 
of the purely administrative duty of collecting and remitting the use tax.'" 
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 304 (1992) (quoting North Dakota v. 
Quill Corp., 470 N.W. 2d. 203, 219 (1991)). 

[120]. Masterson, supra note 27, at 215 (emphasis added).

[121]. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 328 (White, J., dissenting).

[122]. See Ervin, supra note 1, at 525.

[123]. See id. at 534. States have adopted an economic nexus standard for the 
imposition of state income and franchise taxes upon non-resident financial 
institutions.

[124]. See id. at 525-26. Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Tennessee, and West Virginia have enacted such tax legislation. In 
Massachusetts, for example, a financial institution has economic presence when 
and if it satisfies one of the following three criteria: has 100 customers in 
the state, has assets of $100 million attributed to the state, or has gross 
receipts of at least $500,000 attributed to the state. See Craig J. Langstraat 
and Emily S. Lemmon, Economic Nexus: Legislative Presumption or Legitimate 
Proposition?, 14 AKRON TAX J. 1, 10 (1999). 

[125]. See Ervin, supra note 1, at 526.

[126]. Id. at 532 (quoting North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W. 2d 203, 218 
(1991)).

[127].437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 992 (1993).

[128]. See id. at 18. "Geoffrey's reliance on the physical presence requirement 
of Bellas Hess is misplaced." Id. 

[129]. See id. at 15.

[130]. See id. at 17.

[131]. Id. at 16. The court added that, "[b]y providing an orderly society in 
which Toys R Us conducts business, South Carolina has made it possible for 
Geoffrey to earn income . . ." Id. at 18. 

[132]. Id. (citing Am. Dairy Queen, Corp. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 605 
P.2d 251, 255 (1979)) (emphasis added).

[133]. A total of ten states, including Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey and North Carolina, have enacted legislation codifying Geoffrey's 
economic nexus standard. See Langstraat, supra note 124, at 15-16.

[134]. Nine states have pursued an economic presence standard without 
legislative action. Such states include: Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, and Tennessee. See id. at 16-17.

[135]. Seven states, including Alabama, Michigan, Ohio, and Texas, have been 
hesitant to apply this doctrine. See id. at 17-18.

[136]. H.R. 4328, P.L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (The Internet Tax Freedom Act is 
part of Titles XI and XII of Division C of the Omnibus Consolidated and 
Emergency Appropriations Act of 1999).

[137]. See id. See also generally Annette Nellen, Federal Internet Tax Freedom 
Act The Myths and The Realities, at 
http://www.cob.sjsu.edu/facstaff/nellen_a/ITFA.html (Feb. 1999). The ITFA 
contains a grandfather clause that protects states who had already implemented a 
tax on Internet access and allows them to continue to do so under this 
moratorium.

[138]. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1104 (2)(A)(i).

[139]. See id. § 1104(2)(iv). See generally Nellen, supra note 137.

[140]. See, e.g., Internet Tax Moratorium and Equity Act, S. 512, 107th Cong. 
(2001) (introduced by Sen. Dorgan, the bill enables states more freedom in their 
simplification process in exchange for their right to collect taxes from out-of 
state vendors); Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, S.288-IS, 107th Cong. (2001) 
(introduced by Senators Wyden and Cox, it permits states to collect from 
out-of-state vendors if they simplify their tax systems); The Internet 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2000, H.R. 3709, 106th Cong. (2000) (amended version 
was passed by a House vote of 352 to 75); H.R. 3252, 106th Cong. (2000). See 
generally Noto, supra note 109.

[141]. See, e.g., The Internet Nondiscrimination Act of 2000, H.R. 3709, 106th 
Cong. (2000); Internet Tax Moratorium and Equity Act, S. 512, 107th Cong. (2001) 
(introduced by Sen. Dorgan); S. 1611, 106th Cong. (2000) (introduced by Sen. 
McCain).

[142]. H.R. 1552, 107th Cong. (2001). This Act extends the Internet Tax Freedom 
Act through November 1, 2003. In November 2001, the Senate rejected an amendment 
to this Act, introduced by Sens. Mike Enzi, R-Wyo., and Byron Dorgan, D-ND, that 
"would have required Congress to either grant or deny states the Brain Krebs, 
Senate Passes Two-Year Internet Tax BanUpdate, Newsbytes, at 
http://www.newsbytes.com/news/01/172220.html (Nov. 15, 2001). 

[143]. See Ichel, supra note 46, at 647.

[144]. Langstraat, supra note 124, at 12 (quoting Karl A. Frieden and Michael E. 
Porter, The Taxation of Cyberspace: State Tax Issues Related to the Internet and 
Electronic Commerce, STATE TAX NOTES (Nov. 11, 1996)).

[145]. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 764 (1967) 
(Fortas, J., dissenting).

[146]. "The preferred solution is to find ways to keep Internet commerce in the 
state consumption tax and federal income tax bases, and to bring mail-order 
commerce into both tax bases at the same time." J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., 
Electronic Commerce and the State and Federal Tax Bases, 2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 
7 (2000).

[147]. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 329 (1992) (White, J., 
dissenting). He added, "we should not adhere to a decision [Bellas Hess], 
however right at the time [1967], that by reason of later cases and economic 
reality can no longer be rationally justified." Id. at 333 (White, J., 
dissenting).

[148]. The Quill Court recognized that this issue is one which "Congress may 
[not only] be better qualified to resolve, but also one that Congress has the 
ultimate power to resolve." Id. at 318. The Court added that, "Congress remains 
free to disagree with our conclusions." Id. (citing Prudential Insurance Co. v. 
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946)).


Related Browsing

http://ecommercetax.com This site provides news and information about the 
taxation of e-commerce. It provides practical information as well as policy.

http://www.e-tax.org.uk This site addresses e-commerce taxation from a European 
perspective, particularly Great Britain.

http://www.jmls.edu/cyber/index/tax.html A site sponsored by John Marshall Law 
School that has articles, cases, and statutes related to the taxation of 
e-commerce.

http://www.ecommercecommission.org The site of the Advisory Commission on 
Electronic Commerce provides a compilation of reports on e-commerce issues 
including taxation and other policy concerns.

http://www.ntanet.org The National Tax Associations's webpage that outlines 
their Communications and Electronic Commerce Tax Project.

http://www.cbpp.org/512webtax.htm The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 
website provides a paper discussing the effect of a federal moratorium on 
Internet commerce taxes.


Copyright 2001 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology