The Tension Between Safeguarding National Security and the Drive to Develop Quantum Technology
By: Sarah Reutti
In 2018, President Trump signed into effect the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) as part of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019.[1] This Act put into place the statutory foundation for the U.S. government to regulate emerging technologies.[2] Among these identified technologies was quantum computing.[3]
ECRA authority allows the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) to enact strict licensing rules worldwide to keep sensitive quantum hardware out of the hands of our political adversaries.[4] However, many of these exporting limitations have negative implications on the scientific collaboration, mergers, acquisitions, and investments needed by the United States to develop the technology.[5] As it currently stands, the United States relies heavily on foreign expertise in quantum development due to the international nature of research in the field alongside a global shortage of quantum computing experts.[6] Even this limited foreign expertise is hard to come by as visa challenges complicate talent acquisition.[7]
The situation is further complicated by the threat that quantum computing poses to national security.[8] A powerful quantum computing machine can use Shor’s algorithm to break the public-key encryption which protects classified government secrets, military communications, and other critical infrastructure.[9] This threat is the very reason why nations are engaging in a race to develop the technology. There is an obvious tension between the continuing U.S. legislation limiting the international scope of quantum technology and the need to share information transnationally to develop the technology. An effort to counteract this tension surrounding exports at the international level is the Wassener Arrangement, first developed in 1996.[10] The arrangement was primarily created with the goal of promoting transparency and responsibility in the transfer of conventional arms as well as dual-use technologies in an effort to prevent potential internationally destabilizing military developments.[11]
The arrangement’s predecessor was the “Cold War-era Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls” (COCOM).[12] This Committee was created in an effort to restrict exports from nations to the former Soviet Union and its then eastern allies.[13] Unlike COCOM, Wassenaar is not targeted at any specific region or grouping of states. It instead identifies “states of concern” to members.[14]
Currently, the Wassenaar Arrangement has failed to reach a consensus on updating export controls for quantum computing because of objections from the Russian federation.[15] Because the arrangement requires unanimity among its 42 member nations, these objections have become a significant problem.[16] However, it seems that to solve this issue the United States and other “like-minded” nations have shifted to a plurilateral approach (Wassenaar Minus One) thus enacting parallel national restrictions between themselves independently.[17]
It will be interesting to see how the circumstances continue to develop as nations simultaneously race to develop quantum computing technology and protect and silo themselves from foreign adversaries. As put by Edward Parker, “[i]t’s hard to overstate the consequences that might occur if a bad actor acquired the ability to use a quantum computer to break today’s cryptography.”[18]
[1] Adrienne Braumiller, et al., United States Export Control Reform Act and Emerging Technologies, Braumiller Law Group, PLLC, https://www.braumillerlaw.com/united-states-export-control-reform-act-and-emerging-technologies/ [https://perma.cc/EM33-CGL8] (last visited Oct. 4, 2026).
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Clare Zhang, US Puts Export Controls on Quantum Computers, AIP (Sep. 26, 2026), https://www.aip.org/fyi/us-puts-export-controls-on-quantum-computers [https://perma.cc/PU2X-UEZT]; 50 U.S.C. §§ 4801–4852 (2018).
[5] James Dimarogonas, et al., The Quantum Age and Its Impacts on Civil Justice, RAND (Apr. 29, 2025), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA1000/RRA1020-1/RAND_RRA1020-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/L54Y-MRKD].
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Edward Parker, U.S.-Allied Militaries Must Prepare for the Quantum Threat to Cryptography, RAND (June 6, 2025), https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/06/us-allied-militaries-must-prepare-for-the-quantum-threat.html [https://perma.cc/3H5S-79JY].
[9] Id.
[10] Daryl Kimball, The Wassenaar Arrangement at a Glance, Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/wassenaar [https://perma.cc/8EPY-EJX3] (last visited Oct. 4, 2026).
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Ian J. Stewart, Are New US Export Controls Rules on Chips and Other Critical Tech Good Enough?, The Bulletin (Sep. 13, 2024), https://thebulletin.org/2024/09/are-new-us-export-controls-rules-on-chips-and-other-critical-tech-good-enough/ [https://perma.cc/CHK4-D3UV]; Managing Quantum Computer Export Controls in an Era of Geopolitical Competition, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oct. 8, 2026), https://www.sipri.org/events/2026/managing-quantum-computer-export-controls-era-geopolitical-competition [https://perma.cc/K9QK-CD7M].
[16] Supra note 10.
[17] Trade Compliance Flash: BIS Takes New Approach for Export Controls on Quantum Computing, Other Advanced Tech, Miller & Chevalier (Sep. 10, 2024), https://www.millerchevalier.com/publication/trade-compliance-flash-bis-takes-new-approach-export-controls-quantum-computing-other [https://perma.cc/6N6N-7LMT].
[18] Supra note 8.