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Steering Towards Secrecy

By Brian Kennedy

 

Autonomous vehicle development is far from science fiction, but the technology that makes these vehicles operate raises serious concerns for many. Waymo, a subsidiary of Alphabet, is “an autonomous driving technology company.”[1] In August of 2021, the company announced the launch of its “Waymo One Trusted Tester program” in San Francisco.[2] The program allows accepted residents to ride in Waymo’s autonomous vehicles in the hopes of improving the service.[3] California is not new to the concept of autonomous vehicles considering the California Department of Motor Vehicles “oversees the largest autonomous vehicle testing program in the country, with over 60 companies permitted to operate test vehicles on public roads.”[4]

Now, Waymo is facing challenges to keep certain aspects of the autonomous technology secret.[5] The company recently filed suit against the California DMV in an effort to maintain secrecy on topics related to “how it plans to handle driverless car emergencies, what it would do if a robot taxi started driving itself where it wasn’t supposed to go, and what constraints there are on the car’s ability to traverse San Francisco’s tunnels, tight curves, and steep hills.”[6] It should be noted that these uncertainties are required by the DMV in order to issue a permit to companies using autonomous cars on public roads.[7] The question this lawsuit presents is whether Waymo has trade secret protection regarding this information.[8]

The lawsuit began after an unidentified party submitted a public records request to obtain the company’s deployment application.[9] Under Barclays Official California Code of Regulations “an autonomous vehicle shall not be deployed on any public road in California until the manufacturer has submitted and the department has approved an application for a Permit to Deploy Autonomous Vehicles on Public Streets…”[10] After receiving the public records request, the DMV then permitted the company to “censor sections” that may be sensitive with regard to trade secrets.[11] To which Waymo did, however, the requester objected to the censored information.[12] At which point the DMV invited Waymo to file a lawsuit against the agency.[13]

In the complaint filed by Waymo, the company argued that “[r]evealing this information to Waymo’s competitors, either directly or through publication in the media, would provide Waymo’s competitors with unique insight into Waymo’s approach and strategy on a number of critical technology, engineering and business issues central to its development of autonomous vehicle technology…”[14] Additionally, they argue that the company has taken steps to ensure the confidentiality of this information including limiting this information to certain individuals within the company, implementing software and physical barriers, requiring confidentiality agreements for certain individuals, and specifically marking information provided to the DMV as “Confidential Business Information.”[15]

Despite this controversy, the company “has been more willing to share data then most AV companies, but largely on its own terms.”[16] For example, Waymo published “6.1 million miles of driving data from 2019 and 2020 from its test fleet in Arizona, including 18 crashes and 29 near-miss collisions.”[17] Regardless of its previous disclosures, this lawsuit raises serious questions as to what information should be available to the public.[18] Consumers may want to know more about these vehicles before they put their own safety in the hands of robots.

 

[1] General: What is Waymo?, Waymo, https://waymo.com/faq/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2022).

[2] Welcoming our First Riders in San Francisco, Waymo (Aug. 24, 2021), https://blog.waymo.com/2021/08/welcoming-our-first-riders-in-san.html.

[3] See Jennifer Elias, Waymo Opens Self-driving Car Testing to Some San Francisco Residents, CNBC (Aug. 24, 2021, 12:43 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/24/waymo-opens-self-driving-car-testing-to-some-san-francisco-residents.html.

[4] Andrew J. Hawkinis, Waymo Sues California DMV to Keep Diverless Crash Data Under Wraps, the Verge (Jan. 28, 2022, 12:36 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2022/1/28/22906513/waymo-lawsuit-california-dmv-crash-data-foia.

[5] Russ Mitchell, Waymo Sues State DMV to Keep Robotaxi Safety Details Secret, L.A. Times (Jan. 28, 2022, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2022-01-28/waymo-robot-taxi-sues-state-secret-black-ice.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, § 228.06 (2021).

[11] Mitchell, supra note 5.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Complaint at 8, Waymo LLC v. Cal. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2022).

[15] Id.

[16] Hawkins, supra note 4.

[17] Id.

[18] See Mitchell, supra note 5.

Image source: https://waymo.com/careers/

The Legal Industry’s Low-Code Solution

By Charlie McCarthy

 

No-code legal software stands uniquely positioned to provide the legal industry with cost-effective and highly versatile solutions for delivering legal services in the new workforce environment.  The legal industry faces retention challenges and a call to modernize from both employees and clients.[1] The 2022 CLIO report found that firms were more likely to invest future spending in software solutions than any other investment.[2] Firm leadership held this viewpoint because they viewed software as strategic investments that create lower-cost tools to boost revenue to allow long-term and higher-cost staff investments.[3] No-code legal software stands apart to adapt to the legal industry’s dynamic fiscal and operational needs.[4]

No-code application platforms provide lawyers with building elements to create their own applications tailored to their specific automation and digital workflow needs.[5] Low-code software, a predecessor to no-code, is “visual-focused software… targeted towards developers… for those skilled in programming to program faster.”[6] Low-code is often discussed alongside no-code as an answer for simplifying software delivery for legal services.[7] However, low code is solely focused on the software developer, which requires the legal provider to outsource costly IT integration and adhere to rigid perimeters once the software is implemented.[8] Conversely, no-code software is centered on lawyers as builders and eliminates the need for the lawyers to have any programming knowledge to build their applications.[9] Operationally, no-code features “visual building such as drag and drop tools, (allowing) lawyers to manipulate pre-built blocks of code to handcraft technological solutions while the platform auto-generates the code in the background.”[10] Typical no-code applications involve automating intake procedures, auditing compliance, automating document and contract creation review and management, providing automatic business flow updates, tracking financial metrics, and automated performance review processes.[11] Additionally, no-code eliminates the expensive, complex, and time-intensive process of having software developers build specific code for particular business needs.[12] A significant benefit to no-code software is that it allows lawyers to prototype their applications, update as needed, and scale to meet their clients’ needs.[13]

BRYTER, a leading no-code service automation platform, provides “the backend capability of a powerful corporate solution with a more user-friendly, intuitive design, so all users have access… allow(ing) users in the organization to start creating digital tools themselves and have them published and enterprise-ready”.[14] Their approach lets lawyers build their own digital applications in only a matter of weeks to manage their specific business needs while providing the capacity to build software on top as complexity requires.[15] Legal OS, another no-code platform, creates digital knowledge graphs “to be used to build legal service products, generate documents, embed compliance, or automate processes through the open-source Legal OS automation platform.”[16] No-code companies appeal to enterprises to allow their employees to become “citizen coders” and build their apps to increase workplace efficiency.[17]

The pandemic has broadened the acceptance of the role of technology in the effective delivery of legal services.[18] Despite expense cuts, law firms increased their technology spending by 7.1% during the 12-month period through November 2021.[19] As the delivery of legal services evolves with client and employee demands, no-code software stands apart as readily available technology to provide adaptable and cost-effective solutions in the delivery of legal services.

 

[1] Thomas Reuters Institute, 2022 Report on State of the Legal Market 1, 23-24 (2021).

[2] CLIO, LEGAL TRENDS REPORT, 44 (2021).

[3] Id.

[4] Olga Mack, Preparing for the No-Code and Low-Code Age of Law, Bloomberg Law (May 24, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/preparing-for-the-no-code-and-low-code-age-of-law.

[5] Id.

[6] What is no-code, BRYTER, https://bryter.com/trends/what-is-no-code/.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Mack, supra note 4.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Steven Lerner, Push For Attys To Code Loses Steam In No-Code World, Law 360 pulse (Aug 13, 2021), https://www.law360.com/pulse/articles/1412598/push-for-attys-to-code-loses-steam-in-no-code-world.

[13] BRYTER, No-code for Law Firms 28 (2021).

[14] Id. at 14.

[15] Id.

[16] Legal OS (2021), https://www.legalos.io/.

[17] No-code for law firms, supra note 13, at 14.

[18] See generally Legal Trends Report, supra note 2.

[19] State of the Legal Market supra note 1, at 23.

Image Source: https://zvolv.com/blog/blog/2020/02/03/the-rise-of-no-code-development-platforms/

Deepfakes and the Copyright Connection: Analysing the Adequacy of the Present Machinery

Deepfakes and the Copyright Connection: Analysing the Adequacy of the Present Machinery

By Akhil Satheesh

Introduction:

As the United States, for the second consecutive year accounts for deepfakes in the National Defense Authorization Act, (NDAA), and calls for the Department of Homeland Security to prepare annual reports[1] on this technology for the next 5 years, the issued presented by it can no longer be swept under the rug.

Deepfakes consists of a pair of competing algorithms[2], a generator that renders artificial content and a discriminator that identifies which aspects are original or fake. This generative adversarial network (GAN) is self-learning, and each time the discriminator algorithm observes content to be fake, this information is supplied to the generator, resulting in the creation of more convincing images/videos with each new iteration.

Deepfakes possesses immense potential for malicious use, with over 90%[3] of deep fake content being false pornographic videos of individuals without their consent and false political propaganda.[4]

Regulating Video Doorbell Surveillance—Your Neighbors are Recording

By Chris Jones*

 

I. Introduction

As technology continues to evolve, private companies are weaponizing consumers with surveillance tools ultimately utilized for purposes far beyond the average user’s expectation. Ring doorbells are effectively turning neighborhoods into “surveillance hotbeds” while allowing the government to track neighbors’ movements on the curtilage of their own property.[1] Amazon provides police access to Ring’s footage without obtaining a warrant. This footage can be used to continuously track ones movement in both private and public spaces by connecting footage from multiple Ring doorbells. As a result, individuals are subjected to unwanted surveillance from neighbors acting as conduits for law enforcement, without probable cause or judicial oversight.

This article argues the utilization of Ring doorbells—as a neighborhood surveillance tool—have become a considerable threat to ones privacy in their own home. In October, 2021, an Oxford County Court determined that a neighbor’s Ring video and audio recording doorbell violated the UK General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”). Thus, in order to integrate the benefits of technology with the sanctity Americans expect in their own homes, Congress should require informed consent for recording from all entities that own property within the range of a surveillance doorbell.

II. Overview of Ring Doorbell Surveillance

In 2018, Amazon acquired Ring and partnered with local law enforcement agencies in the U.S. to expand neighborhood surveillance.[2] Amazon’s partnerships provide police departments with access to an online portal where officers can view footage from local Ring users without obtaining a warrant.[3] Cities promote Ring doorbells to local residents and purchase subsidized Ring devices with taxpayer funding.[4] In turn, these partnerships benefit Amazon by expanding Ring’s nationwide surveillance network and promoting its devices.[5]

Ring doorbells are essentially surveillance cameras that replace a traditional doorbell.[6] A video doorbell detects motion ranging from people approaching the door, to cars driving by, to neighbors entering their homes on property within the camera’s range.[7] The software is synchronized with an online application that allows the owner to “see, hear, and speak to visitors in real time from anywhere.”[8] Ring doorbells have the capacity to record audio from as far as 40 feet away.[9] While Ring includes a Privacy Zone option to block the taping of a neighbor’s property, it requires the user take affirmative action to utilize this setting.[10]

Ring uses the data to access, use, preserve, or disclose content to law enforcement, government, or third parties for various purposes.[11] By utilizing footage from Ring, law enforcement can essentially track an individual’s movements through private and public spaces by linking together one camera after another. Deleted content and user recordings may still be retained by Ring in order to comply with certain legal obligations.[12] Therefore, once footage is recorded, the user does not control their personal content.[13]

Additionally, Amazon has been found to utilize footage of consumer doorbell cameras for its own advertising purposes, further violating the privacy of unsuspecting neighbors.[14] Recent reports believe that Ring is implementing facial recognition into its surveillance devices, adding an entirely new spectrum of surveillance.[15] Thus, Ring doorbells endanger the privacy of all individuals, even those who do not have an Amazon account.[16]

III. Legal Background

An individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is often measured by the standard established in Katz v. United States.[17] In Katz, the court moved away from constitutionally protecting ones privacy in physical spaces to protecting the privacy of an individual themselves.[18] The court implemented the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test where an individual’s expectation is measured by whether it is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.[19]

In United States v. Antoine Jones, the court determined that law enforcement should not have immediate access to every move a person makes over an extended period of time without consent or a warrant.[20] The court held that the warrantless placement of a GPS tracking device on a person’s vehicle—in order to track all of the movements of a person on public streets—was considered an unlawful search, violating the “effects” portion of the Fourth Amendment.[21]

In Jones, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent contemplated the mosaic theory of privacy where individuals have a reasonable expectation that their movements will not be recorded and aggregated “in the sum” to infer one’s personal beliefs, habits, and potentially sensitive information.[22] While substantial privacy indicators, Katz and Jones only apply to the government leaving individuals vulnerable to exploitation from private entities.[23]

Minimal federal statutes currently exist to regulate the use of private surveillance cameras. The Wiretap Act allows for silent video recording through a network; however, places restrictions on the recording of aural communications.[24] Some states allow audio recording for conversations in which one participating party has provided consent.[25]

In October, 2021, Oxford County Court Judge Melissa Clarke determined a neighbor’s Ring video and audio recording doorbell violated the UK Data Protection Act 2018 and the GDPR.[26] According to Clarke, “the video images and audio files that the Ring doorbell and cameras captured of the neighbor” were property belonging to the neighbor.[27] While the United States relies on a patchwork of federal and state statutes, private tort claims, sectoral laws, and FTC rules to enforce privacy regulation, it lacks a comprehensive federal privacy law, comparable to the GDPR.[28]

IV. Ring Doorbell Owners Lack Consent to Publicize Neighbor’s Footage

In the United States, there is a gap in legal protection for recording ones movements on the curtilage of their own home, something the public considers private. For example, Google recognized this need for privacy and instituted a policy to blur the data that appears in Google Street View photos.[29] This data includes license plate numbers, people’s faces, and other indentifying marks of a person or place—especially those with sensitive ramifications.[30]

“Persistent and targeted surveillance collapses individual moments of interaction, spread out over time and mitigated through human forgetfulness, into one long story of an individual’s life.”[31] This type of surveillance can lead to inferences about highly sensitive areas of a person’s life, such as addictions, health, religion, or sexual activities.[32] When one is under surveillance for a long period of time—as a Ring camera does—the nature of the harm changes with the scope of the protectable right of privacy.[33] For example “one photograph of a person in public may offend his dignity. Twenty-eight days of targeted tracking meaningfully disrupts his environment and his behavior.”[34]

Ring intrudes on ones right to privacy while on the curtilage of their home.[35] As the Court determined, “the curtilage of the home is considered as ‘part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment’ purposes and, thus, afforded the same protections.”[36] The curtilage “consists of the area immediately surrounding a home where the private details of the home naturally extend, and it is ‘intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically.’”[37] Thus, the reasonable expectation of privacy afforded to individuals in their home should be extended to the curtilage and should apply to private parties—like Ring.

Moreover, concerns exist over what technology companies actually do with the footage once they collect it, potentially aggregate it, and retain it.[38] Mission creep occurs when parties gather data for one reason; however, end up using it in bad faith or find other uses for it, even when not explicitly authorized.[39] Here, Ring is owned by Amazon—one of the world’s largest retailers—known for its excessive marketing efforts.[40] If Amazon and Ring were to exchange data revealing a consumer’s every movement near their own home, it would likely benefit Amazon’s marketing division,

In response to the Oxford County Court’s ruling, Amazon issued a statement encouraging users to respect their neighbor’s privacy and comply with applicable laws.[41] Ring’s violation of wiretapping laws is discussed in a forum on Amazon’s website. Here, various individuals focus on obtaining consent from those standing on the user’s front porch—not from neighbors who happen to live nearby.[42]

Critics argue that The Wiretap Act allows general surveillance footage to be obtained without informed consent from those in the video, provided there is no aural component. However, Ring’s video doorbells have the ability to record audio from 40 feet away. Thus, a property owner’s conversation in their own yard could very well be captured by a neighbor’s doorbell. While some states allow recording aural conversations with consent from one party, the consenting party must participate in the conversation. Therefore, the recording of neighbor’s aural conversations—in which the recording party is not participating—likely violates The Wiretap Act.

Other critics argue the owners are lawfully on their own property and possess rights to the footage recorded. Thus, the owners can provide informed consent to viewing and sharing of the recordings to others. This position may lead to high privacy walls constructed around individual properties. Even then, Ring would still track the comings and goings of cars entering the property.

As the Supreme Court has exemplified the principles recognizing an individual’s right to privacy in their own autonomy,[43] the same concept should apply to private entities. If state actors are prohibited from tracking ones every movement, private parties should be prohibited as well. Therefore, Ring’s recording of residents on the curtilage of their private homes should be viewed as unauthorized access and property of the subject being recorded. Ring is a private party and the footage subjects have not consented to the recording or publishing of their movements or conversations.

V. Solution

While many bills have been proposed, there are still no comprehensive privacy laws at the federal level, let alone any statutes to specifically regulate neighborhood doorbell surveillance.[44] The Supreme Court has implied that Congress is the “best-situated body to protect privacy interests in the face of burgeoning technological advances.”[45] In Jones, the Supreme Court has “shown a willingness to uphold legislation providing for appropriate uses of and safeguards against the sort of technology whose abuse may result in substantial encroachments by the government into private life.”[46]

Absent a comprehensive federal privacy law, this article proposes Congress should enact legislation to require informed consent for recording from all entities that own property within the range of a surveillance doorbell’s camera. This statute should include a private right of action that allows ordinary citizens to bring suit against neighbors who record surveillance footage of their property without consent. The private right of action is necessary for increased compliance as a doorbell owner would be far more likely to honor a neighbor’s refusal to consent if they knew that individual could bring a private lawsuit against them. Without a private right of action, it would be incredibly costly and onerous for a regulatory agency—such as the FTC—to enforce. This right would minimize the role and expenses required for enforcement of this law and increase the likelihood that neighbors would police themselves.

Compliance with this statue would be simple as Ring doorbells have the ability for a property owner to block out areas of footage through Privacy Zone settings. This would only necessitate companies, like Ring, to provide doorbell owners with a standard consent form that complies with the statute. Prior to activating the Ring device, users would be required to sign a contract stating they would obtain a signed consent form from any property owners within the camera’s range. Therefore, the responsibility for compliance would fall entirely on the owner, relieving Ring of any burdensome enforcement.

Thus, while an individual’s movements in public spaces may be subject to taping and publicity, ones movements and conversations while on the curtilage of their own home should be sacred. An individual’s personal space requires special consideration to end this substantial encroachment into ones private life.

VI. Conclusion

Congress is well positioned to deal with the new surveillance issues resulting from Ring doorbells and similar technological devices. Action must be taken at the federal level in order to curtail this significant invasion of privacy occurring from neighbors’ recording. By providing sweeping protection for all U.S. residents from unwanted doorbell surveillance, Congress can help to balance the benefits of technology with the sanctity we have all come to expect in the privacy of our own homes.

 

* J.D., Gonzaga University School of Law. Acknowledgments and gratitude to Noelle Green and Professor Drew Simshaw for their invaluable insights and continuing support.

[1] See Dan Milmo, Amazon asks Ring Owners to Respect Privacy after Court Rules Usage Broke Law, Guardian, (Oct. 14, 2021),  https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/oct/14/amazon-asks-ring-owners-to-respect-privacy-after-court-rules-usage-broke-law  (Hannah Hart, a digital privacy expert at ProPrivacy, explains that Ring’s doorbells enable “a small number of residents [to] effectively transform public spaces into surveillance hotbeds, and even share their recordings with police”).

[2] Grace Egger, Ring, Amazon Calling: The State Action Doctrine & the Fourth Amendment, 95 Wash. L. Rev. Online 245, 245-46 (2020).

[3] Id. at 253.

[4] Id. at 251.

[5] Id. at 254.

[6] See Ring Video Doorbells, Ring, https://ring.com/doorbell-cameras/ (last visited May 6, 2021).

[7] See generally id.

[8] Ring Terms of Service, Ring, https://ring.com/terms (last updated Dec. 8, 2020).

[9] See Ring, supra note 6.

[10] Understanding Privacy Zones, Ring, https://support.ring.com/hc/en-us/articles/360027979331-Understanding-Privacy-Zones (last visited May 3, 2021).

[11] Ring, supra note 8.

[12] Ring, supra note 8.

[13] See Ring, supra note 8.

[14] See Ariana Aboulafia, Greg Fritzius, Tessa Mears, & Macy Nix. The Price of Prime: Consumer Privacy in the Age of Amazon. 42 Mitchell Hamline L. J. Pub. Pol’y & Prac. 138, 149 (2021).

[15] Hannah Bloch Wehba, Visible Policing: Technology, Transparency, & Democratic Control, SSRN 1, 39  (Mar. 10, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3552240.

[16] See Aboulafia, Fritzius, Mears, & Nix, supra note 14, at 140.

[17] See Katz. V. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967).

[18] See id.

[19] Id.

[20] See United States v. Jones, 132 U.S. 945, 955-57 (2012).

[21] Id. at 946-47.

[22] See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 311, 328 (2012).

[23] See Wayne Unger, Katz and COVID-19: How a Pandemic Changed the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, SSRN 1, 24 (Sept. 14, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3692652.

[24] The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Title 1. 18 U/S.C. §§2511.

[25] See id.

[26] See Milmo, supra note 1.

[27] See Milmo, supra note 1.

[28] See Chris Jones, The iOS 14.5 Update: A Game Changer for Federal Privacy Law, 28 Rich. J. L. & Tech., no.1, (2021).

[29] Patrick Gallo & Houssain Kettani, On Privacy Issues with Google Street View, 65 S.D. L. Rev. 608, 610  (2020).

[30] Id.

[31] Margot E. Kaminsky, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 Boston U. L. Rev. 167, 215 (2015).

[32] Id.

[33] See id. at 217.

[34] Id.

[35] See generally Matthew R. Koerner, Drones and the Fourth Amendment: Redefining Expectations of Privacy, 64 Duke L. J. 1129, 1139-40 (2015).

[36] Id. at 1139.

[37] Id.

[38] Richard M. Thompson II, Domestic Drones and Privacy: A Primer, Cong. Research Serv. 1, 8-9 (Mar. 30, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43965.pdf.

[39] Benjamin White, Clipped Wings: Domestic Drone Surveillance and the Limits of Due Process Protection, 86 U. Cin. L. Rev. 357, 360 (2018).

[40] Lauren Debter, The World’s Largest Retailers 2020, Forbes (May 13, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurendebter/2020/05/13/the-worlds-largest-retailers-2020-walmart-amazon-increase-lead-ahead-of-the-pack/?sh=56601dd18d35.

[41] See Milmo, supra note 1

[42] See Can you disable audio recording to avoid violating wiretapping law requiring 2 party consent in states like ma, ca, pa, il, wa, ct, etc?, Amazon  (Jan. 21, 2018),  https://www.amazon.com/ask/questions/Tx1OXUJ8ZWUHROA/?.

[43] See Katz, 389 U.S. at 358; See Jones 132 U.S. at 955-57.

[44] White, supra note 39, at 373.

[45] White, supra note 39, at 373.

[46] White, supra note 39, at 389.

Source image: https://www.howtogeek.com/thumbcache/2/200/17aed3e8a5b5d78d4cc204c52c0e704e/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/digital-surveillance-eye.jpg

 

Marijuana Breathalyzers?

By Alyssa Thompson

 

In the last several years, states have changed their laws regarding marijuana use rapidly.[1] As evidenced by the graphic above, marijuana use is only fully illegal in four states (South Carolina, Kansas, Wyoming, and Idaho).[2] With legalization and decriminalization of marijuana the legal status in the majority of states, DUIs stemming from cannabis consumption have become a topic of discussion.

Alcohol has been a known culprit for impaired driving for decades.[3] However, researchers have recently found that marijuana has also become a major culprit for impaired driving.[4] From 2000 to 2018, the percentage of crash deaths involving marijuana have increased from 9% to 21.5%.[5] A 2017 Colorado survey found that 70% of cannabis consumers drove under the influence of marijuana at least once within the last year, while 27% of consumers reported to drive high almost daily.[6] Perhaps one of the reasons marijuana related fatal car crashes are on the rise is because most marijuana tests can “…not distinguish between past use and acute intoxication,”[7] making it difficult for law enforcement to crack down on high driving.

In Virginia, the police may arrest someone for a DUI if they suspect the person is driving under the influence of marijuana.[8] Since Virginia does not have an acute intoxication detection technology, blood tests are needed to detect THC.[9] However, these blood tests cannot pinpoint when the driver last smoked or ingested marijuana as THC can remain detectable for up to several weeks after ingestion. In order to convict a driver for driving under the influence of marijuana, the courts will need to rely on an officer’s perception of an individual in conjunction with the blood test[10], which may prove problematic. Juries may not be willing to convict for a marijuana related DUI if it cannot be proven that the driver had ingested marijuana just prior to arrest.

Some companies have attempted to create acute intoxication technologies, or in other words, a marijuana breathalyzer.[11] A California based company, Hound Labs Inc., and a Canadian Company, Cannabix Technologies Inc., have reported to have invented functional marijuana breathalyzers.[12] These breathalyzers allegedly can detect THC on an individual’s breath.[13] Hound Labs Inc.’s technology can only pick up THC during the “peak window of impairment” or approximately 1 to 2 hours after ingestion.[14]

So, if the technology is out there why isn’t law enforcement using it? Perhaps one of the largest hurdles this technology has yet to clear is passing a legal standard.[15] In Virginia, the legal driving limit for alcohol is 0.08%. State governments would have to conduct research to find the safe legal limit for marijuana if they do not wish to implement zero tolerance laws. This would likely prove costly. The marijuana breathalyzers may be quite costly themselves, with one California police department reporting they would have to pay $1,000 per breathalyzer.[16] It is also possible that the Covid-19 Pandemic has left state and local governments with fewer resources, making obtaining marijuana breathalyzers a lower priority. As of present, it is unclear whether marijuana breathalyzers will be utilized by law enforcement any time soon.

 

[1] Map of Marijuana Legality By State, DISA, https://disa.com/map-of-marijuana-legality-by-state (last updated Jan. 2022).

[2] Id.

[3] Jessica Colarossi & Jazmin Holdway, Deadly Car Accidents Involving Cannabis and Alcohol Have Doubled in 20 Years, Boston Univ. (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.bu.edu/articles/2021/deadly-car-accidents-involving-cannabis-and-alcohol-have-doubled/.

[4] See id.

[5] Id.

[6] Lilly Price, Marijuana Breathalyzer Aims to Detect High Drivers ‘without unjustly accussing’, Usa Today (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/08/07/pot-breathalyzers-hound-labs-marijuana/912705002/.

[7] Colarossi, supra note 3.

[8] Understanding Virginia Marijuana DUI Charges – How Do They Prove It?, Randall, Page, & Bruch, PC (July 29, 2020), https://www.randallpagelaw.com/news/article/understanding-virginia-marijuana-dui-charges-how-do-they-prove-it.

[9] Id.

[10] See id.

[11] Price, supra note 6.

[12] See id.

[13] See id.

[14] Id.

[15] See, e.g., Despite New Technology, Some Police Officers Do Not Use Marijuana Breathalyzers, Your Central Valley (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.yourcentralvalley.com/news/local-news/despite-new-technology-some-police-officers-do-not-use-marijuana-breathalyzers-2/.

[16] See id.

Image Source: https://disa.com/map-of-marijuana-legality-by-state

Spotify Patented Emotional Recognition Technology to Recommend Songs Based on User’s Emotions

By Najah Walker

 

Spotify is a Swedish-based music service that provides music fans across the world with the ability to legally stream millions of songs.[1] Spotify has garnered massive success since its launch in 2008 and has grown to be one of the biggest streaming platforms in the world.[2] The innovative service was ahead of its time in the early 2000’s by compensating music artists based on the streams they received.[3]

Thirteen years later, Spotify continues to be a leader in innovation.[4] Spotify has patented a technology that can analyze human voice and surrounding noises to make song suggestions based on “emotional state, gender, age, or accent” and several other characterizations.[5] According to the patent, Spotify’s new technology would be able to access a user’s social settings and determine if they were at a party, a small group, or if they were alone.[6] Spotify intends for this technology to better assist users by providing more accurate music recommendations.[7]

They have been adamant about the need to protect their user’s privacy, disavowing “any future research or applications that violate ethical standards of data usage”.[8] However, several users and artists are concerned that Spotify’s new technology will come at the expense of user privacy.[9] Several activists groups, users and musicians have called the technology invasive and have suggested the software is discriminatory.[10] One musician candidly said, “Claiming to be able to infer someone’s taste in music based on their accent or detect their gender based on the sound of their voice is racist, transphobic, and just plain creepy”.[11] There is also a concern that the use of artificial intelligence to recommend music in this way will further divide, be inaccurate and exclude people who don’t speak the languages the system might have been hardcoded to prioritize over others.[12]

Although Spotify may have pure intentions to offer their users the best musical experience, they may do more damage than good by implementing this technology.[13] While it may not be fully accepted yet, similar technology has already been patented by Apple, Google and Amazon in the last few years.[14] The reality of the situation is in the next few years speech emotional recognition technology may be widely used and effect more than just Spotify users.[15]

 

[1] See How Spotify Came to Be Worth Billions, BBC News (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-43240886.

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] See generally Mark Savage, Spotify Wants to Suggest Songs Based on Your Emotions, BBC News (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-55839655.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] See Umberto Bacchi, Spotify Urged to Rule Out “Invasive’ Voice Recognition Tech, Reuters (May 4, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-music-privacy/spotify-urged-to-rule-out-invasive-voice-recognition-tech-idUSKBN2CL1K9.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] See Josh Mandell, Spotify Patents A Voice Assistant That Can Read Your Emotions, Forbes (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshmandell/2020/03/12/spotify-patents-a-voice-assistant–that-can-read-your-emotions/?sh=51556b3438d5.

[15] Id.

Image Source: https://in.pinterest.com/pin/540361655297878027/

Blockchain as Best Practice: The Benefits of the Criminal Justice System Implementing Blockchain Technology

By Merritt Francis

 

Blockchain technology was created in 2008 by an anonymous group or person, the creator(s) of Bitcoin, “Satoshi Nakamoto.”[1]  Blockchain is a set of technologies that creates an encrypted, distributed/ decentralized ledger.  A “decentralized” ledger means there is no central authority.  Rather, the information is shared and distributed to thousands of computers (“nodes”) on a peer-to-peer network, which are located around the world.[2]

The decentralized ledger could, for example, maintain an accurate system of payments and receipts for the cryptocurrency associated with the blockchain.   Central authorities, such as a bank maintaining a ledger of all its users’ transactions, are lucrative targets for cybercriminals.[3]  Because a blockchain does not exist in one place, it offers two distinct advantages over centralized authorities: broader access, and greater security.[4]

Blockchains are comprised of “blocks,” which are digitally recorded data that are linked together in chronological order into one “chain.”  Once the “block” of data is chained to the other existing data on the blockchain, the data cannot be altered without altering all the subsequent blocks of data, which would require collusion from a majority of the network’s computers located around the world.[5]  Put differently—it is nearly impossible to alter data once it is encrypted onto a blockchain.  As a result, blockchain technology can be utilized as a tamper-evident and tamper-resistant way to structure, store, and secure data.

The implementation of blockchain technology into our everyday lives is inevitable. And, there are infinite benefits the legal field will realize once the private and public sectors utilize blockchain technology.  As discussed below, our criminal justice system would greatly benefit from utilizing blockchain technology.

The most identifiable benefit of blockchain technology is its real-time, immutable record-keeping ability.  Foreign judicial systems have already implemented blockchain technology as a tool for surveilling parolees.[6]  In Foshan, China, law enforcement officials created a community correction program to track the location of convicted offenders in real-time.[7]  Parolees are required to wear electronic bracelets fitted with a tracking encryption program at all times.[8]  Because the system uses blockchain technology to track the results, the data gathered is completely resistant to tampering and corruption.[9]

The United States’ judicial systems, on the other hand, use manual check-ins and over-burdened case workers to keep track of its paroled criminals.  Implementing blockchain technology will simplify the entire parole process, while also making it a more trust-worthy system in the process.

The immutable, real-time record-keeping will also be key in issuing warrants and maintaining criminal histories.[10]  Courts issue search and arrest warrants to multiple different agencies, such as law-enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and probation and parole officers.  Once a warrant is issued, numerous criminal-justice partners need “read” and “write” access to the warrant.[11]  Law-enforcement officers are often required to contact the issuing court to validate the warrant, while other law-enforcement officers “pack” a warrant with additional information about the defendant.[12]  The number of participants and handoffs involved in issuing and executing warrants makes it an excellent area to employ blockchain technology.

The same goes for maintaining an accurate record of an individual’s criminal history.  Prosecutors, courts, and criminal-history repositories are all responsible with updating criminal charges.  Approximately 20,000 people in the United States are falsely accused, convicted, and incarcerated each year.[13]  Today, many criminal-justice partners use manual data entry, ongoing audits, and quality-control efforts to maintain their respective databases.  But, with blockchain technology, the courts, prosecutors, and law-enforcement officers could all make changes to the initial Blockchain arrest record, flowing throughout the adjudication process, tying charges to ultimate dispositions.  Every time an amendment is made, the blockchain records the party who made the amendment.  And, individuals can only make amendments when they have been delegated such authority.

Blockchain technology will also significantly benefit chain of custody in criminal cases.  Current evidence management systems are susceptible to theft, tampering and, at its worst, manipulation of evidence within the evidence management system.[14]  But, there would be drastic improvements to a chain of custody’s integrity if evidence was recorded on blockchain technology.   When submitting evidence into police custody, officers would be required to report the state of the evidence as it was being submitted.  Then, any person removing the evidence would have to confirm the evidence was in the same state as the blockchain reflects.  Further, any person receiving the evidence in a chain of custody would immediately be able to compare the “state” of the evidence as it was recorded in the system with the “state” last recorded on the blockchain.  If the evidence appears to have been tampered with, the receiver can refuse to accept the evidence and report the problem immediately, instead of receiving it while lacking knowledge as to the evidence’s condition when it was first taken into custody.  In a court-setting, an individual accused of a crime would be able to compare evidence collected at the scene to the evidence’s recorded “state” on the blockchain.[15]

Implementing blockchain technology in criminal law would significantly increase the efficiency and integrity of our current criminal law system.  Moreover, the technology is readily available, as developers are creating privatized blockchains for companies and agencies looking to benefit from the increased efficiency and integrity.

 

[1] Grace Kay, The many alleged identities of Bitcoin’s mysterious creator, Satoshi Nakamoto, Business Insider (Nov. 28, 2021), https://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-history-cryptocurrency-satoshi-nakamoto-2017-12#:~:text=The%20many%20alleged%20identities%20of%20Bitcoin’s%20mysterious%20creator%2C%20Satoshi%20Nakamoto&text=The%20identity%20of%20Bitcoin’s%20creator,become%20a%20top%20digital%20currency.

[2] Di Graski & Pail Embley, When Might Blockchain Appear in Your Court?, Nat. Cen. for St. C. (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/14913/blockchaininthecourts.pdf.

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] John Salmon & Gordon Myers, Blockchain and Associated Legal Issues for Emerging Markets, Note 63, Int’l. Fin. Corp. (Jan. 2019), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/14913/blockchaininthecourts.pdf.

[6]  Sophia Scott, Blockchain Behind Bars: The Case for Cryptocurrency in Criminal Justice, Harv. Tech. Rev. (Aug. 28, 2021), https://harvardtechnologyreview.com/2021/08/28/blockchain-behind-bars-the-case-for-cryptocurrency-in-criminal-justice-2/.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Graski, supra note 2.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13]  Derick Anderes et al, The Use of Blockchain within Evidence Management System, https://f.hubspotusercontent10.net/hubfs/5260862/Ebooks%20and%20Whitepapers/Blockchain%20of%20Evidence%20FINAL%20DRAFT-3.pdf.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

Image Source: https://www.smh.com.au/business/for-security-agencies-blockchain-goes-from-suspect-to-potential-solution-20171203-gzxq2j.html

Arrestee DNA Collection

By Alyssa Thompson

 

Introduction

Since 1997, select states have been collecting DNA samples from particular arrestees.[1] Between 2006 and 2011, twenty-three states passed legislation authorizing this practice.[2] As of 2013, thirty states and the federal government take part in DNA collection of certain arrestees.[3] Around half of the states collecting DNA collect for any felony, while the other half limits collecting from violent felonies or sex crimes.[4] As of 2013, eight states collect for select misdemeanors.[5] Additionally, eight states and the federal government collect from juveniles.[6]

Samples are taken via a buccal swab.[7] This has become a popular method as it is seen as a minimally invasive method of DNA collection.[8] The swab is placed inside the check and obtains DNA in the form of buccal epithelial cells.[9] If an inmate refuses, the federal government instructs testers to use force to obtain the sample.[10] If carried out correctly, buccal swabs are just as accurate as blood tests.[11]

Processed samples are entered into the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”), a national database containing samples contributed by federal, state, and local forensic laboratories.[12] According to the FBI, these DNA samples identify offenders, exclude innocent persons, solve past and future crimes and combat recidivism.[13] Further, DNA samples in this context have solved a number of cold cases.[14]

States differ on how they destroy the samples if the charges brought do not lead to conviction.[15] The majority of states only destroy the sample upon request, meaning the individual, against whom charges were brought and subsequently dropped or lead to acquittal or dismissal, must bear the burden of getting the sample expunged.[16] It can cost anywhere from $50 to $500 to expunge a record.[17] In states that require the individual to initiate the expungement process, very few expungements occur.[18] This is likely due to a lack of informing individuals of their right to have their record expunged coupled with the costs of expungement.

Fourth Amendment Concerns

DNA collection is undoubtedly a search. Under the Fourth Amendment there are two contexts in which a search can take place. First there is the investigatory context. Under this context, if there is an objective justification for the action, a law enforcement officer’s subjective intent is not relevant to a court’s inquiry of the matter.[19] The second context is the special needs context. Subjective intent does matter when there is no objective justification for the search. This includes inventory searches and administrative searches. Law enforcement may not use the special needs context as a way to get around the 4th amendment – the search must be for the reason law enforcement purports it to be (i.e., inventory or identification). Until 2013, the question was under which context did DNA collection of arrestees reside?

In Maryland v. King the Supreme Court indicated that DNA testing of felony arrestees resided in in the special needs context.[20] This means that the subjective intent of law enforcement should matter. Yet, the majority held that the DNA collection was for identification and that identification was the subjective intent of law enforcement.[21] Thus, the practice was held Constitutional under the 4th amendment.[22]

Personally, it’s hard to imagine that the actual subjective intent of law enforcement for collecting DNA is to identify the arrestee. As the dissent in King points out, the average response time for identification based on fingerprints is about 27 minutes.[23] However, DNA samples can take months to come back with identification.[24] Further, the fingerprint database includes “detailed identification information, including ‘criminal histories; mug shots; scars and tattoo photos; [and] physical characteristics like height, weight, and hair and eye color.’”[25] CODIS contains none of this, not even a name.[26] The only identification happening with CODIS is the matching of an already known individual to an unknown sample of DNA.

The dissent in King argued that the DNA was being used under an investigatory purpose, therefore the government should need probable cause before collecting the DNA.[27] However, probable cause for cold cases will rarely exist as the police did not have the probable cause needed to arrest the person for the initial crime in the first place.

Despite these arguments, DNA collection of an arrestee has been deemed Constitutional under the 4th amendment.

Conclusion

There is no dispute that DNA collection of arrestees aids in the accuracy of the criminal justice system. The results can exclude innocent persons and solve past and future crimes.[28] While the states and federal government hail the buccal swab as minimally invasive, it may be argued that the information of which it is capable of obtaining makes it signicantly invasive, not the procedure itself.

I hold serious doubts as to whether DNA collection from arrestees is a Constitutional practice under the 4th amendment. I agree with the dissent in Maryland v. King. Under their reasoning, the police must at least have probable cause to swab for DNA. In the context of decades old cold cases, the police surely do not have the probable cause needed to search the arrestee for the cold case because if they had it, they would’ve already searched and arrested the arrestee. In that sense, law enforcement is taking a dragnet approach to investigating crime. That sort of approach is not supported by the particularity requirement of the 4th amendment.

 

[1] Julie Samuels et al., Collecting DNA From Arrestees: Implementation Lessons, 270 NIJ J. 18, 19 (2012) (citing Louisiana as the first state to authorize DNA collection from arrestees).

[2] See id.

[3] Nat’l Conf. of State Legis., DNA Arrestee Laws (2013) [hereinafter “DNA Arrestee Laws”].

[4] Samuels et al., supra note 1, at 21.

[5] DNA Arrestee Laws, supra note 3.

[6] Id.; Samuel et al., supra note 1.

[7] DNA Arrestee Laws, supra note 3.

[8] See What Is a Buccal Swab?, Dynamic DNA Laboratories (Mar. 18, 2019), https://dynamicdnalabs.com/blogs/news/what-is-a-buccal-swab.

[9] Id.

[10] Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Inmate DNA Sample Collection Procedures (2010) [hereinafter “Inmate DNA Sample Collection Procedures”].

[11] What is a Buccal Swab?, supra note 8.

[12] Rebecca Beitsch, DNA Upon Arrest: Solving Cold Cases or Presuming Guilt?, PEW (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/01/12/dna-upon-arrest-solving-cold-cases-or-presuming-guilt; Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet.

[13] Inmate DNA Sample Collection Procedures, supra note 10.

[14] Samuels et al., supra note 1, at 18 (noting the CODIS match that solved a rape case from a decade earlier); Maryland v. King, 549 U.S. 435 (2013) (solving a 6-year-old unsolved rape case); see also Michelle Taylor, Texas: Arrestee DNA Collection Solved Over 250 Cases in One Year, Forensic Mag (Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.forensicmag.com/570491-Texas-Arrestee-DNA-Collection-Solved-Over-250-Cases-in-One-Year/.

[15] Samuels et al., supra note 1, at 23.

[16] See id.

[17] Beitsch, supra note 12.

[18] Samuels et al., supra note 1, at 23.

[19] See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).

[20] King, 549 U.S. (2013).

[21] Id. at 465-66.

[22] Id.

[23] Id. at 478.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Id. at 466.

[28] See Inmate DNA Sample Collection Procedures, supra note 10.

Image Source: https://dynamicdnalabs.com/blogs/news/what-is-a-buccal-swab

Michigan Court of Appeals Makes it Clear: No Warrant, No Drone

By Nate Gilmore

 

The Fourth Amendment reads in part that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . .”[1] This has been the bedrock of privacy protection since 1791. Nevertheless, as technology advances, debates have broken out over whether drone surveillance will “outflank” this Fourth Amendment right to privacy.[2] Last March, however, the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled in Long Lake Township. v. Maxon that drone footage of private property did constitute a search, and therefore a warrantless application violated the Fourth Amendment.[3]

In the landmark case of Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a reasonable expectation of privacy (both subjective and objective) is required to constitute a search under the fourth amendment.[4] The Supreme Court has subsequently made it clear that, in the world of aerial surveillance, the police need not obtain a warrant when observing what is visible with the naked eye.[5] Faced with yet another decision possibly shrinking privacy rights, the Court took a promising turn in Kyllo v. United States. Law enforcement officers used a heat-sensing device to scan an apartment complex to determine if the heat coming from the building was consistent with the high-temperature lamps used for marijuana growing.[6] Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that when the government uses technology not in general public use to “explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion. . . .” then it constitutes a search.[7] Justice Scalia voiced his concern with the power of technology shrinking the right to privacy, stating that “[r]eversing this approach would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology-including imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the home.”[8] These concerns over technology more capable than the naked eye might have just saved the right to privacy in drone surveillance.

In Long Lake Township. v. Maxon, Long Lake Township used a drone to fly over the Maxon family residence after a growing suspicion that the family was violating a zoning ordinance by operating an illegal “junkyard.”[9] The Maxon family moved to suppress the drone footage as part of an illegal “search.”[10] The trial court initially denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that the defendants lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy under Ciraolo and Riley.[11] The Michigan Court of Appeals relied heavily on Kyllo in its reversal, comparing how both heat-sensing technology and “low altitude, specifically targeted drone surveillance” of private property are distinct from the human-operated aircraft in both Ciraolo and Riley.[12] The speed and stealth of a drone makes it “capable of drastically exceeding the kind of human limitations that would have been expected by the framers not just in degree, but in kind.”[13]

The powerful holding presented will hopefully be the catalyst for courts across the country in the fight for privacy against drone use: “[W]e conclude that persons have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their property against drone surveillance, and therefore a government entity seeking to conduct drone surveillance must obtain a warrant. . . .”[14]

 

[1] U.S. Const. amend. IV.

[2] John Villasenor, Will Drones Outflank the Fourth Amendment?, Bookings (Sept. 20, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/will-drones-outflank-the-fourth-amendment/.

[3] Long Lake Twp. v. Maxon, No. 349230, 2021 WL 1047366 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2021).

[4] 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

[5] See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (finding that police flying in public airspace 1000 feet over the property is not a search under the Fourth Amendment even though privacy fences surrounded the yard from ground level); see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 455 (1989) (finding that police observation of a partially exposed greenhouse from a helicopter 400 feet in the air did not constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment).

[6] Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).

[7] Id. at 40.

[8] Id. at 28.

[9] Long Lake Twp., 2021 WL 1047366 at *1.

[10] Id.

[11] Id. at *2.

[12] Id. at *6.

[13] Id.

[14] Id. at *7.

Image source: https://www.publicradiotulsa.org/local-regional/2019-02-11/measure-aims-to-regulate-drone-use-over-private-property

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